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WEEKLY INT SUMMARY - SIXTH ARMY GROUP - ETO

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

P-118

By Authority of
CG, 6th Army Group
Initials: UCH
Date: 8 May 1945

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 33
FOR THE WEEK ENDING 8 May 1945

538/37
16 MAY 1945
DIRECTOR
OF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

Army Group G comprising Nineteenth and First German Armies surrendered unconditionally to 6th Army Group with effect from 1200B Hours, 6 May 1945. No alternative had been left the enemy Army Group. Its rear was exposed by the ~~capitulation~~ **SURRENDER** of German Forces in Italy effective at 1200B Hours on 2 May. In addition, the rapid friendly advances into the valleys of Western Austria had split its remaining area into several segments. The unpreparedness of defenses and the scanty forces ordered to hold the approaches into the mountain fastnesses of Western Austria clearly indicated that the formation of a redoubt area was merely a belated thought and meant to have been a haven for only a selected few.

Actually the military defeat of Army Group G had been accomplished in the drive through the SAAR-PALATINATE and across the Rhine. Lieutenant General SCHULTZ was never able to present a cohesive front after the initial rout of his First Army by the US Seventh Army. The rate of attrition in manpower continued so high that there never was the slightest possibility of the enemy's keeping sufficient bodies on the line, let alone trained soldiers.

The total disorganization of Army Group G was apparent in the plight of its armies. Nineteenth Army, pocketed time and again by First French Army's highly mobile forces, reached the ALPS without a single divisional formation and was reduced to fighting from a series of promptly isolated strongpoints. First Army yielded more than 200,000 prisoners of war between 28 April and 4 May. Both Armies had lost all organizational cohesion to the point where there was no longer a possibility of coordinated action even between their lowest formations. The capability of defense itself had disappeared, as the retreat turned into a rout. In most cases, opposition by the enemy was due solely to his having been overtaken or surrounded by advancing Allied forces.

There is no question of the complete destruction of Army Group G. The total annihilation of its motley components was forestalled by its surrender. As it was along the entire front, so in the zone of the 6th Army Group, the German Wehrmacht was incontestably defeated on the battlefield.

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BY Norman Koppen
ON 15 Jul 74
BY AUTHORITY OF Adm. Whitcomb
DATE 12 May 72

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2. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT

a. 6th Army Group Front Line at Time of Surrender (061200 B Hours) of Army Group "G"

Along the Swiss - LICHTENSTEIN - AUSTRIAN Border at C 3653, C 4150, BLUDENZ (Z 8348), RANKWEIL (C 4554), C 4460, C 4864, DORNBIRN (C 5269), C 5275, C 6482, C 6982, C 7386, IMMENSTADT (C 8686), MITTELBERG (C 8261), C 9271, HINDELANG (C 9881), GRAN (D 1281), D 0164, WELZAN (C 9252), D 0759, D 1261, BODEN (D 1858), D 2058, NAMLOS (D 2166), D 1567, EHENBICHL (D 2478), D 2775, UNTERGARTEN (D 3672), D 3468, D 3163, D 2958, D 2753, V 4851, PERFUCHS (V 3844), OPSTEIG (D 4161), D 3663, GRIESEN (D 4279), D 5480, KRUNZBACH (D 6280), D 6065, D 5563, D 5160, D 6457, INNSBRUCK (D 7556), W 0643, VITIPENO (W 0415), BRENNERO (W 1126), D 7956, D 9562, KUNDL (E 2083), E 1985, E 1079, D 9467, MUHLAU (D 7961), D 6860, D 6264, SCHARNITZ (D 6771), D 6681, WALLGAU (D 6786), Y 1300, MURBACK (Y 8802), Z 0902, Z 1907, Z 3009, Z 3103, BICHL (E 1885), E 2083, WORG (E 2685), OBERNDORF (Z 3700), Z 3820, UBERSEE (Z 5525), Z 84 (Z 9606), ST LEONHARD (Z 9817), SALZBURG (Z 9925), LAUFEN (Z 8841), BURGHAUSEN (Z 7964), Z 8770.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ). Surrendered unconditionally at 061200B Hours.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

The semblance of organization heretofore maintained by First German Army disappeared during this period and surrender was made of piecemeal units when the end arrived. The army was completely impotent in the face of Allied thrusts as far east as SALZBURG and south beyond the Italian border. Whatever resistance the enemy still offered in the northern approaches of the ALPS between WALCHEN SEE (D 79) and KUFSTEIN (E 3396) became futile when our drive through the INN Valley threatened to cut off these positions.

At the end of the period the only divisions still capable of temporary organized resistance were 38 SS Grenadier Division under LXXXII Corps, holding along the INN east of MUHLDORF (Z 5372); 407 Mobilization Division and 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, both withdrawing south of the INN River under control of XIII SS Corps. The following First Army divisions were decimated to less than 500 combat infantry effectives and were considered destroyed for all practical purposes: 9, 19, 36, 79, 212, 553 Volksgrenadier; 198, 416 Infantry; 2 Mountain; 151 Field Training; and von HOBE Divisions.

LXXXII Corps was responsible for the right and XIII SS Corps for the left half of the Army front. There is no evidence of the existence of XIII Army Corps which was previously overrun.

During the last phase First Army lost approximately 230,000 prisoners of war. Most of these were from a large array of miscellaneous units and from service outfits. This total also accounts for the destruction of the majority of the Army's divisions. 9 Hungarian Infantry Division surrendered intact with approximately 9,000 men and is included in the above total. The combat infantry strength of 17 and 38 SS Divisions, 407 Mobilization Division, and of other divisional remnants was estimated to be 7,000.

Captured documents confirmed the enemy's intention to defend the so-called "Redoubt" area. Army Group G was ordered to retreat to the ALPS. However, it was so badly disorganized when it reached the mountain bastion that, even with favorable terrain, a successful stand was out of the question.

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Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. BRANDENBERGER)

Nineteenth Army, far from being able to rally its harassed forces, lost the biggest part of the divisions still at its disposal. The Army put up a very feeble defense of the northwestern part of the Alpine area.

Not a single Nineteenth Army division was capable of effective defensive action. The following divisions all have a combat infantry strength of less than 500: 47, 139, 246, 257, 559 Volksgrenadier and 465 Mobilization Divisions. Apart from miscellaneous units, these constitute the only combat forces at the disposal of the Army. Their combat infantry effectives were estimated to total 3,000 men. The Army lost approximately 100,000 prisoners during the period.

Nineteenth Army was completely isolated by the meeting of Allied forces south of the BRENNER Pass. With hostile troops to its front, rear, and right flank, and SWITZERLAND on its left, the Army surrendered.

(3) Twenty-Fourth German Army (CG: Maj. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

This Army was for a long period guarding the Swiss frontier east of BASEL against the eventuality of an Allied violation of Swiss neutrality.

More recently agents mentioned the Army staff as moving south from BREGENZ, probably into the heart of the ALPS. Furthermore, a captured document placed the First Indian Legion under Twenty-fourth Army. This legion was identified southeast of Lake CONSTANZ along the Swiss border.

The units under command of Twenty-fourth Army never amounted to more than a skeleton force of low-grade, miscellaneous outfits, most of which the enemy was wary of committing to action. However, these units were absorbed by the Nineteenth German Army during the last days and only the staff of Twenty-fourth Army remained at the time of ~~capitulation~~
SURRENDER

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

The surrender of General von VIETTINGHOFF, German Commander in Chief Southwest, and SS General WOLFF, Supreme Commander of SS and Police in Italy, became effective at 1200 hours GMT on 2 May. With this capitulation, hostilities on the 6th Army Group Alpine Front officially ceased.

There was little activity on the Alpine Front during the period. The enemy withdrawal began in the coastal area with the departure of the 34 German Infantry Division on the night of 23/24 April. It was followed by 5 German Mountain Division and the Italian MONTE ROSA and LITTORIO Divisions which began their departure on the night of 24/25 April. The enemy withdrawal in the area from the coast to MONTGENEVRE (K 4503) was completed between 23 April and 27 April. The units were to move to BOLZANO by way of TRENTO, the days being allowed for completion of the move. One battalion of the 100 Mountain Regiment had managed to reach T 6177 by 28 April but there it surrendered in toto. The remainder of 5 Mountain Division and 34 Infantry Division had arrived in the TURIN area by 29 April. Blocked by Partisans, the city was bypassed on the west and the major portion of both divisions moved north toward IVREA (J 2270). Harassed by Partisans and cut off from Germany, both divisions assembled south of IVREA and awaited the Allies. Attempts by the Partisans on 3 May to obtain a surrender were fruitless as the Germans wished to surrender to regular forces.

The two Italian Divisions, LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA disintegrated after leaving their positions on the Franco-Italian border, their members surrendering to Partisans.

1. OPERATIONS

a. SOUTHERN GERMANY

As the period opened, all organized resistance in the Black Forest, the Swabian Jura, and on the Konstanz Peninsula ceased. Only disorganized small groups of enemy delayed the Allied push east. The entire north shore of Lake CONSTANZ and the city of FRIEDRICHSHAFEN (C 3196) was cleared on 30 April. Small enemy groups fell back to BREGENZ (C 5281) and IMMENSTADT (C 8788) where attempts were made to block the passes leading into the Austrian panhandle. Both towns were cleared by 2 May and overcoming ineffective opposition, friendly forces pushed south along the Swiss border and along the Iller River. By 4 May BLUMENFELD (C 848) was cleared.

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has been occupied.

LXXX Corps, with only remnants of few divisions remaining, fell back into the Austrian Alps, attempting to delay and to block the passes behind them. On 1 May, Lieutenant General FRANZ BAYER (CG LXXX Corps) and his Chief of Staff, Colonel KOESTLIN were captured, thus ending the career of LXXX Corps. Allied forces pushed south along the LECH and OBERAU Valleys, overcoming difficult terrain, roadblocks, and demolitions. GARMISCH (D 5382) was reached on 29 April. At FUSSEN (D 2389) Fieldmarshal WILHELM RITTER VON LEEB was captured and at GARMISCH Fieldmarshal WILHELM LIST was taken prisoner. South of MITTENWALD (D 6577) the approaches to the Inn Valley were defended by fanatical Hitler Youth and other small groups. Numerous obstacles retarded progress. Negotiations for the surrender of INNSBRUCK failed but Allied forces met little resistance after entering the Inn Valley and INNSBRUCK was occupied against negligible opposition on 3 May. From here, Allied forces pushed rapidly south, securing the BRENNER Pass and linking up with other forces pushing up from Italy on 4 May. Advances were also made along the Inn River and by 4 May WORG (E 2685), to the east, and IMST (D 2753), to the west, had been reached against little opposition.

By 28 April, the First German Army had lost AUGSBURG and its battered forces were deployed on a north-south line along the LECH River and east along the DANUBE River. From this line, enemy infantry with tank support fought delaying actions back toward MUNICH. Only light and scattered contact was made by friendly units in the AMMER (Y 54) and WURM (Y 62) Lakes region as the northern suburbs of MUNICH were reached on 29 April. The Dachau Concentration Camp (Y 7569), containing 32,000 political prisoners, was defended by 300 SS troops. These were overcome and the camp was liberated at 292000B April. During the night, enemy artillery fire was placed on the town of DACHAU. Resistance in MUNICH broke during the afternoon of 30 April and by midnight, the entire city had been cleared. Thus MUNICH, the cradle of Naziism, fell to the victorious Allied forces.

Beaten remnants fell back as friendly units advanced south and east from MUNICH. Armor driving down the Autobahn reached the Inn River at Z 2721 against negligible resistance. At Y 9049, 100 planes in good condition were captured and at Y 9754, 10 jet type planes were taken as little contact was made southeast of MUNICH. At BAD TOELZ on 1 May, Fieldmarshal GERD VON RUNDSTEDT, the epitome of Junker aristocracy, became the Allies' foremost prisoner of war. On the same day, the infamous Admiral HORTHY of Hungary also was made prisoner. The 9 Hungarian Infantry Division surrendered to friendly units at Z 2155 on 2 May. The advance east along the foothills of the ALPS met only light and scattered small arms fire. ROSENHEIM (Z 1927) was taken during the evening of 2 May as the Germans, having heard of HITLER'S death, prematurely celebrated the end of the war. A push south from ROSENHEIM (Z 1927) along the Inn River reached WORG (E 2685) on 4 May where a juncture was made with forces driving along the Ill River from the west. SALZBURG (Z 9524) surrendered as Allied troops raced east along the Autobahn, reaching that town on 4 May. While SALZBURG was being occupied, another column sped southward against little opposition to capture BERCHTESGADEN (Z 9506). HITLER'S mountain retreat, DER BERGHOF, was reported on fire as capturing units approached.

b. ALPINE FRONT

Southern Zone: On 28 April, friendly troops on the coast fell back from BORDIGHERA (S 8986) to VENTIMIGLIA (S 8587); the line of forward troops then ran through TENDA (N 8820) and along the ROIA to its mouth on the coast east of VENTIMIGLIA. To the north, VINADIO (N 5647) was bypassed and the following day contact was established with elements of the Central zone at PIANCHE (N 5148). Meantime, on 28 April, fighting was reported in CUNEO between German troops and Partisans. The town was declared clear the next day. On 30 April an Allied reconnaissance toward LIMONE (N 8833) reached the north end of TENDE tunnel (N 8731). The enemy remained quiet until the surrender on 2 May.

Central Zone: At the beginning of the period, DEMONTE (N 6647) and SESTRIERES Pass (H 3922) were reached and a junction was effected with southern troops at PIANCHE. A prisoner of war reported that the general withdrawal from the central area began on 24/25 April. On 29 April OULZ (K 5414), BARDONNECHE (K 4318), CESANNE (K 5203), and the main villages of the QUEYRAS (P 47) region were occupied. In the TURIN area, elements of the 34 Infantry Division were fighting northwest of the city on 30 April. The next day, the division was reported bypassing TURIN in a move to the northwest on the route: ORBASSANO (H 9222), RIVOLI (H 9229), VASSELLO (H 9237).

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Friendly forces did not pursue. The commanding general and 5,000 men of the 34 Infantry Division declared willingness to surrender 2 April, but the following day they refused to surrender to the Partisans.

North Zone: The enemy launched raids on ROC NOIR (H 4362) positions on the night of 27/28 April, following up by attacks in strength on FORCLE Pass (H 46) and friendly positions south of PETIT ST BERNARD (C 4401). These attacks were repulsed and the enemy expelled from the PETIT ST BERNARD area on 29 April. At the same time, Partisan forces encircled an enemy salient on MONT CENIS (H 4457) and BUSSOLENO (H 6240) and SUSE (H 5340) were occupied. Thereafter positions remained quiet until the general surrender.

c. ATLANTIC FRONT

OLERON: After some enemy artillery fire on GALON D'OR (Y 3294) on 25 April, all was quiet until 29 April when 80 rounds of 75 mm fell on BOURCE-FRANC (T 2900) from LE GRAND Village (T 2202). Friendly landings on the island began at 400600B April on the beach east of POINTE DE GATSEAU (Y 2397). By 0955B, POINTE DE MENSON (Y 2598) was reached against weak infantry and medium artillery opposition from the enemy who had expected the landing on the east coast and had massed his reserves at DOLUS (T 2108) and at ST PIERRE D'OLERON (T 1811). Friendly advance was brought to a halt at dusk by an enemy counterattack at the north edge of GRAND VILLAGE. The following morning, however, friendly motorized elements entered ST PIERRE D'OLERON, the capital of the island, and captured the German governor, who issued a directive for a general surrender. Enemy troops had already begun giving themselves up to civilians. When troops holding out in the fort at BOYARD VILLE (T 2314) complied with the directive, all resistance ceased on the island, the last of the enemy surrendering during the night of 01/02 May.

LA ROCHELLE: On 29 April the enemy gave evidence of consolidating positions before VOUTRON (T 4022). Next morning at 0900B, the diversionary attack against LA ROCHELLE was launched from the south, taking THAIRE (T 4124) by 1245B. VOUTRON and YVES (T 3819) were taken the following day as reconnaissance showed that the enemy had withdrawn to the main anti-tank ditch. The attack from the east began at 1630B of 2 May against AIGREFUILLE (T 4730). The enemy fell back to a line of resistance ST MEDARD (T 4434), ANGOUTE (T 3723), and by noon, friendly troops were established on a semicircular line around LA ROCHELLE (T 4527), AIGRE, MEUILLE, VIRSON (T 4932), ANAIS (T 4937), NUAILLE (T 4841), PETIT LAPIN (T 4548). Activity on 3 May was confined to an artillery duel while the enemy fell back all along the line, taking up positions along the anti-tank ditch before LA JARRIE (T 4131). On 4 May, artillery fire was light and infantry activity negligible.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

ENCLOSURE

Enc #1 - Enemy Disposition as of
5 1200 B May 1945.


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**G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #33
ENCLOSURE #1**

**ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 5 1200 B MAY
SCALE 1/1,000,000**

FIRST ARMY DIVISIONS VIRTUALLY DESTROYED		NINETEENTH ARMY DIVISIONS VIRTUALLY DESTROYED	
2	151 TNG	47	257
9 dsb	198	189	465
19	212	246	559
36	416		
79	553		
GS	VON HOBE		



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APO 23, U. S. Army

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:By Authority of :
:CG, 6th Army Group :
:Initials: CLH :
:Date: 28 April 1945: :
:.....:

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WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 32

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 28 April 1945

538/4

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

That portion of C in C WEST'S command (Nineteenth Army and First German Army) opposite 6th Army Group failed to receive sufficient reinforcements during the week to aid in either the reestablishment of a front line or even to replace the approximately 78,650 odd troops lost as prisoners of war during the period 21-26 April, exclusive of permanent casualties. The inability of the enemy to halt the eastward drive towards ULM and KEMPTEN rolled up the Suabian Mountain positions and turned the Danube River line. This drive coupled with advances to the south through the places mentioned above effectively disorganized and practically destroyed Nineteenth Army. Further to the east, friendly armor has broken contact between Seventh and First German Armies. This was the situation most to be avoided by Army Group G. The result is that First Army is practically isolated and must fight an independent action with exposed flanks for the defence of MUNICH.

First German Army was unable to find suitable connected terrain features upon which it could reestablish a front line against unrelenting Allied pressure. Its rearward progress has continued for the second successive week. The appearance of Vlassov Russians and Hungarian troops in front line positions could not offset the very great need for artillery pieces, ammunition, motor transport, and tanks. The position forced upon First German Army, isolated by the deep wedge driven into its right flank and the disintegration of the Nineteenth Army on its left flank, will compel its early withdrawal to the Austrian Border. The army will be forced back to cover the city of MUNICH, but due to the unavailability of any cross corridors of strong natural defensive positions in the vicinity, the city will fall rapidly. However, Himmler, who is reported in MUNICH, may urge a final German "Sacrifice" for this town.

APR 45

Nineteenth German Army suffered a tremendous and overwhelming defeat at the hands of the fast moving First French Army. The ranks of the enemy army were cut into numerous pockets and then individually mopped up. The rate of attrition was so high that the enemy's capability of restoring its ranks was not possible of fulfillment. Nineteenth Army will probably have the doubtful honor of being the first enemy army to arrive in the so called "Redoubt" area. It will probably have the mission of manning the few defensive positions already constructed in the BREGENZ-INNSBRUCK area, as well as that of constructing new defenses. The remnants of Nineteenth Army, after having lost approximately 50,000 prisoners of war during the past week, can only hope to delay their day of capitulation.

b. Capabilities

The enemy may be allowed only two actual capabilities:

- (1) He can surrender unconditionally.
- (2) He can continue his senseless immolation, fighting hopelessly from isolated strongpoints as his lines disintegrate.

The overwhelming military defeat of the German armies north of the Danube and in the Black Forest, the dwindling resources both of men and material remaining to the enemy, and the increasingly obvious war-weariness of the civilian population all combine to make a political capitulation imminent. The hold of the Nazi overlords upon the Wehrmacht and the people is definitely weakening, particularly in BAVARIA. The civilian finds himself in a position of fighting for the protection of his home and possessions not against the Allies, but against the fanatics who will not or may not accept defeat. As for the German soldier, prisoner of war status has become certainly more inviting than the prospect of further resistance under conditions of extreme privation.

Should the Nazis choose to resist, whether through a blind but monumental faith in ultimate victory or through simple fear of their own fate, their resistance will be short lived. The north-south valleys of BAVARIA offer no tenable defensive

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positions and will serve as avenues into AUSTRIA. His inferiority in guns, supplies, mobility and total lack of air support are so complete that even field losses cannot be replaced. Feverish activity now in the development of defensive positions in AUSTRIA denotes a realization that he waited too long to make the "National Redoubt" a fact. The enemy is militarily completely defeated; he will be allowed neither respite nor truce, choose whichever one he will.

2. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (South Central Germany)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: INGOLSTADT (T 7124), NEUBURG (T 5421), DINKELHAUSEN (T 5111), PEICHING (T 3312), AUGSBURG (Y 3277), PEITING (Y 3815), FUSSEN (D 2289), VILS (D 1687), KEMPTEN (X 9304), MEMMINGEN (X 8234), EROLZHEIM (X 7345), FISCHBACH (X 5740), WALDSEE (X 5126), UBERLINGEN (X 0608), KONSTANZ (C 0796), RADOLFSZELL (W 9204), WOHUNGEN (W 8303).

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

Some semblance of organization was maintained by First Army's three corps as they fell back offering scattered delaying actions. LXXXII Corps on the right flank gained 36 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 38 SS Division "NIBELUNGEN" as these units were severed from Seventh German Army by the Allied drive toward LINZ. 416 Infantry Division also came under LXXXII Corps upon falling back to the REGENSBURG area. 719 Infantry Division, formerly carried under this corps, gave up its remnants to 416 Infantry Division and its number to 405 Reserve Division in the Black Forest. 256 Volksgrenadier Division remnants have been dropped because of a lack of contact. XIII SS Corps, having lost 416 Division, undertook some shifting of divisions but kept its organization essentially intact. XIII Army Corps gained the remnants of 198 and 19 Infantry Divisions while giving up 9 Volksgrenadier Division staff of which departed for the MUNICH area. Resistance offered by the divisional units was aided by replacement and miscellaneous battle group formations.

(a) LXXXII Corps: (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:), renowned for its skill in refilling its ranks with miscellaneous units, remained in contact throughout the week. Its positions were completely outflanked by the Allied thrust along the Czech border. The division, disposed south-east of REGENSBURG, could hardly hope to contain this spearhead. Its combat infantry strength is estimated at 800.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) was reconstituted by the absorption of elements of 719 Volksgrenadier Division and of other miscellaneous units. The division was responsible for the defense of REGENSBURG, and later, for the Danube line immediately south of that city. It managed to delay Allied progress but was unable to prevent our crossing of the Danube at several points. Divisional combat infantry effectives are estimated to be 1,000.

38 SS Grenadier Division "NIBELUNGEN" (CG:) was formed in the Black Forest in March by special order of the Fuehrer. It has three Grenadier Regiments numbered 95, 96, and 97. They are composed chiefly of Hitler Jugend personnel. The division was known to have been lurking behind the front for some weeks. Elements were identified on 27 April at U 1245, probably foreshadowing the commitment of the bulk of the division. The division's period of formation was extremely short, and its calibre is certainly below previous SS standards. Combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 2,500.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CP: SS Col. BOSCHMANN) retreated straight south from the NEUMARKT area and is now committed on both sides of INGOLSTADT (T 7125). Contact was relatively light as the bulk of the divisions withdrew behind a screening force. Remnants of 352 Volksgrenadier Division operating in the same general area as 17 SS Division are believed to be under command of the latter. Including these, combat infantry strength is about 2,000.

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XIII Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)
79 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ULRICH or ULLICH). Elements of this division were cut off north of DILLINGEN (T 21). The rest managed to withdraw and is now committed in the same general area as 79 Volksgrenadier Division (T 21). In view of the trapped elements and other casualties, combat infantry effectives now total no more than 1,200.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KOLB) was reported by agents to have left the front for MUNICH. Lack of contact during most of the week supported such claims. However, on 27 April elements of the division were identified in the DONAUWOERTH area. It is conceivable that these are subordinated to another division while the 9 Volksgrenadier Division staff is, in fact, in MUNICH. Combat infantry strength is still estimated at 1,000.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Col. REIMHERR) suffered very severe casualties in its engagements during the previous period. Some prisoners estimated divisional combat strength as low as 200. However, some reorganization did take place, elements of "Division" von HOBE as well as miscellaneous units being used as fillers. The division is presently in contact in area T 21. It is still extremely depleted, and combat infantry strength is about 700.

Battle Group von HOBE (CG: Col. von HOBE) is operating to the south of 79 Volksgrenadier Division with which it is closely affiliated, and to which it is known to have lost at least two nominal battalions. Battle group von HOBE's combat infantry strength is estimated to be approximately 1,200.

(c) XIII Corps (CG:)

Maj Gen von CLAER, commanding general of XIII Corps, was captured by US troops on 23 April. He succeeded Maj. Gen. GRAF von ORIOLA who had been captured at the end of March.

19 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) reappeared during the period on the German XIII Corps front. It narrowly escaped our trap south of ULM, whereupon it moved north-east to the AUGSBURG area. The division is still disorganized, and combat infantry strength does not exceed 600.

151 Field Training Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BADE) was identified by 1307 and 1308 Field Training Regiments west of AUGSBURG on 26 April. Little is known of the composition of the division except that the previously destroyed 560 Volksgrenadier Division provided the staff and probable service personnel as well as the cadre. Tentative combat infantry strength estimate is 2,000.

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BARDE) salvaged some elements from the STUTTGART pocket and the trap south of ULM. Prisoners claim that the division's disorganization is complete. Remnants are now located south of AUGSBURG. Their combat infantry strength is not more than 500.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUETER) retreated southward to east of ULM, where elements were cut off by our spearheads. 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified with 559 Volksgrenadier Division to which it was stated to be attached. 553 Division was badly disorganized by its hurried retreats, and combat infantry strength is now estimated at 500.

c. Nineteenth German Army (CG:)

At the end of the period, Nineteenth Army was in a state of complete exhaustion, comparable in many ways to its condition when it escaped from the COLMAR Pocket in early February. XVIII SS Corps, composed of 106, 719, 352, and 89 Infantry Division, was completely destroyed. The numbers 719 and 352 had been assigned to the 405 and 805 Divisions respectively as the divisions took a last breath. LXIV Corps was left without a single divisional unit as only remnants of 257 Volksgrenadier Division escaped from the SCHWABIAN JURA Pocket. The meager resistance to Allied advances in the corps sector was offered by miscellaneous battle group formations. LXXX Corps also suffered heavy losses. The major portion of the Corps was destroyed in the SCHWABIAN Jura pocket. However, the Corps headquarters along with remnants of 257, 246, 559, and 47 Divisions escaped. The Corps was rebuilt to some degree by the addition of the reformed 189 Volksgrenadier Division, the organization of replacement units under 465 Division staff, and the commitment of miscellaneous formations.

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(a) XXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

Miscellaneous Russian Units. The Volunteer Cadre Division, a Russian unit that, until recently, was stationed at MUENSINGEN, was identified during the period. It is organized into four battle groups - LOERGES, LANGE, WRUCK, and DANIELSKE. The division was first committed in area X 39 - X 49 about 22 April. Exact present location is not known, but the division is believed to have retreated to the south-east and to be in the general area Y 10. Initial combat infantry strength was approximately 2,200, but many prisoners including a high percentage of deserters have been taken and the present estimate is 1,300.

Also contacted were elements of 650 Russian Infantry Division. This is another of the series of Russian units formed at MUENSINGEN during the last months. Most of it was reported on the Eastern Front and it is believed that the few companies identified at X 0844 on 22 April represent the only part of the division that remained in the west. Their combat infantry strength is judged at 500.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Gen. ULLMER) moved north from the southern part of the Black Forest to be committed for the first time since its destruction in the COLMAR Pocket in early February. It was encountered on 21 April on the eastern shoulder of the STUTTGART pocket in area S 52. Two of the division's three regiments (1212 and 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiments) had been reformed on a three battalion basis with about 100 men per company. A large part of the personnel is Russian and the rest of the groups are also of low calibre. The division was soon forced to withdraw toward UIM. There its hopes for a defense were dispelled as the city's positions were outflanked from the south. The division had to retreat once again, and what remained of it narrowly escaped the closing Allied pincers south of UIM. These remnants are now believed to be in line in area D 09. The possibility of a close link between 189 Volksgrenadier Division and the Volunteer Cadre Division (Russian) was indicated as prisoners of both units claimed General ULLMER as their commander. Combat infantry strength is now estimated at 1,000.

465 Mobilization Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HOFFMANN), the second Wehrkreis V mobilization division, was contacted, also for the first time, during this period. As was to be expected, it controls an array of Wehrkreis V replacement units. These are committed in the area of X 90. 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment of 16 Volksgrenadier Division is now also under 465 Mobilization Division. Combat infantry strength, including the latter, is about 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) suffered very severe casualties and was pocketed east of TUBINGEN (W 9792) at the beginning of the period. Elements managed to find their way back to the German lines and were met again in the MEMMINGEN (X 8234) region on 27 April. These are believed not to exceed 400 combat infantry effectives.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KUEHNE) was identified by some elements in the MUENSINGEN region. These are the survivors of the two successive pockets - the first at STUTTGART, the second in the SCHWABIAN ALPS. The division had been weak even before these escapades. Now not more than 300 combat infantry effectives are believed to remain.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) had a fate very similar to that of 246 Volksgrenadier Division. It too, was contacted south of MEMMINGEN after two close escapes. 1125 and 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiments had both been reorganized during the previous period and 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiment of 553 Volksgrenadier Division was attached to 559 Volksgrenadier Division. However, casualties were very heavy, and combat infantry strength of remnants is estimated at less than 500.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) is in the same category with both 246 and 559 Volksgrenadier Divisions. Only a small part of the division survived the chase from STUTTGART to the MEMMINGEN - KEMPTEN zone. Prior to the breakthrough, the division's third regiment, 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment, had been reformed, and the 147 Field Replacement Battalion was claimed to have 1000 men. Now, however, not more than 500 combat infantry effectives are thought to remain.

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16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL). Only 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment, now attached to 465 Mobilization Division, remains of this division. It lost heavily in the STUTTGART pocket, and the rest was trapped east of TUBINGEN.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. TRONPETER) found its end in a manner similar to 16 Volksgrenadier Division. Two regimental commanders and the division artillery commander were among the captured. The division is considered totally destroyed.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIGER) was renumbered 719 Volksgrenadier Division, the latter having ceded what remained of its original complement to 416 Infantry Division. The division was caught in the Black Forest pocket and was completely destroyed there.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN) was renumbered 352 Volksgrenadier Division. Elements of the latter were simultaneously reported operating in the INGOLDSTADT sector. These, however, were probably under command of another unit. The division was destroyed in the Black Forest.

89 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BAZING). The staff of this division took over command of 7, 8, and 9 Grenadier Regiments OBERRHEIN. They were renumbered 1056, 1063, and probably 1064 Volksgrenadier Regiments respectively. Formerly their units had been under Brigade BAUER and 1005 Brigade. The division was annihilated in the Black Forest.

106 Infantry Division (CG:) was caught in its entirety in the Black Forest pocket.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP
(Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units)

First German Army	14,000
Nineteenth German Army	<u>6,000</u>
T O T A L	20,000

Reserves:

First German Army	none
Nineteenth German Army	<u>none</u>
T O T A L	20,000

Tanks and SP Guns:

First German Army	50
Nineteenth German Army	<u>25</u>
T O T A L	75

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period, no definite enemy front lines existed opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine front. Friendly advances had reached the following points: CESANA (K 5203), ARGENTERA (N 3959), VINADIO (N 5747), GROCE DI FERISSON (N 6820), TENDA (N 8820), N 9010. BREIL (N 8005), C.S. AMPEGLIO (S 9285).

a. General

The long awaited withdrawal from the Franco-Italian border became a reality this week as Allied Armies in Italy surged forward, smashing enemy resistance and cutting off the retreat routes of the enemy in northwest Italy. A reliable ground source reported that General SCHLENNER, of LXXV Corps ordered the general withdrawal

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from the Franco-Italian front to begin the night of 23/24 April. By 27 April, withdrawal was complete from the coast to MONTGENEVRE (K 4503). Friendly forces pursuing the departed enemy, delayed by mines and demolitions, were unable to establish any contact. In the AOSTA Valley and the MONT CENIS region some German troops remained in position on 27 April but all indications pointed to an early departure. As in many previous instances, the order for withdrawal had been given too late. All main escape routes from North Italy had been cut off by Allied capture of VERONA and by the Partisan activity in TURIN and MILAN. Consequently, the ultimate disposition of the divisions of LXXV Corps is uncertain.

b. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

LXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHLENNER)

34 Infantry Division - German (CG: Brig. Gen. von LIEB) departed from the coastal area where it had gradually lost ground to friendly units which pushed to the ROYA River. On 26 April, contact was completely lost as friendly forces pushed forward up to ten miles in the coastal area, the advance being impeded only by mines and demolitions. On the same day, the division was reported passing through ALESSANDRIA (J 70).

LITTORIO Division - Italian (CG: Gen. TITO AGOSTO) abandoned its positions in the LARCHE Pass after expending its stocks of artillery ammunition on 25 April. Advance friendly elements approaching CUNEO (N 85) from the west on 27 April were unable to regain contact with the division. Other elements of the division (4 Alpine Regt) disposed in the AOSTA Valley were still in contact as withdrawal from this portion of the front had apparently not been completed.

MONTE ROSA Division - Italian (CG: Gen. CARLONI) was formerly deployed along a wide front from COL DE LA GALISE (H 67) to GUILLESTRE (P 47) along with elements of 5 Mountain Division. The MONTE ROSA Division withdrew toward TURIN and contact had been lost by 27 April.

5 Mountain Division - German (CO: Col. STEETS) was deployed in the central sector (SUSA Valley* and in the northern sector AOSTA Valley). This division had not abandoned its positions completely on 27 April. On that day, an enemy patrol was active at BETACHET (H 4298) in the AOSTA Valley. To the south, nearly 600 rounds of artillery and mortar fire were received at MONT CENIS (H 45). This indicated that final departure from the SUSA Valley was imminent. A reliable source reported the bulk of 5 Mountain Division in the TURIN area on 25 April.

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a. SOUTHERN FRANKONIA

As the period opened, XVIII SS Corps, controlling the southern Black Forest area, was severed from Nineteenth German Army by an Allied armored thrust which reached the Swiss border at EPPENHOFEN (W 6213). Simultaneously, DANAUESCHINGEN (W 5627) and SIGMARINGEN (X 1043) were occupied and the Danube between the two towns came under control of Allied forces. FREIBURG (W 0832) was cleared on 22 April and elements of XVIII SS Corps, unable to offer any effective resistance, fell back as friendly forces dashed southward along the Rhine toward BASEL (A 8883). LORRACH (A 9490) was reached, and following the Rhine eastward, WALDSHUT (B 3691) was passed on 25 April. By this date, the remnants of XVIII SS Corps had undergone a hurried reorganization and had pushed eastward in an attempt to leave the Black Forest trap. Meeting initial success, the force reached an area southwest of TUTTLINGEN (W 8031) before being blocked. Hopelessly surrounded, the corps along with scattered units remaining to the west, offered token resistance and had not been completely mopped up at the end of the period.

LXXX Corps fought desperately to extricate a few battered divisions from the STUTTGART pocket. Some degree of success was attained as 198 Infantry Division followed the 465 Division Staff to the ULM (X 6580) area. Remnants of 47, 257, 248, and 559 Divisions also managed to escape. The major portion of these units, however, moved south into the Schwabian Jura, only to find themselves again pocketed by Allied forces pushing south from GÖPPINGEN (S 4014) and east from SIGMARINGEN which met near EHINGEN (X 4766) on 23 April, sealing the fate of the enemy units. The corps headquarters, however, escaped to KEMPTEN (X 9305) where it continued to fight a losing battle with rapidly dwindling forces. Meanwhile, some enemy isolated in the STUTTGART and SCHONBUCH Mountain (W 9698) areas continued to be mopped up until 24 April. The trapped elements of LXXX Corps in the Schwabian Jura maneuvered for several days, attempting to find an escape route while the pocket was being systematically reduced. Finally, on 27 April, this area was declared clear of enemy.

Allied advances continued against negligible opposition. SINGEN (W 8307) and STOCKACH (W 9517) fell on 22 April as the shore of Lake KONSTANZ was reached. The city of KONSTANZ (C 0796) was occupied on 27 April. The enemy offered moderate opposition at ULM but the city, entered from both north and south was cleared on 24 April. Meanwhile, the XIII Corps, south of CRAILSHEIM (S 7062), was being outflanked on the west and began an organized withdrawal. This withdrawal developed into a race for the Danube as Allied armor broke through the crust in the CRAILSHEIM area and sped southeast to DILLINGEN (T 0300) where a bridge over the Danube was secured intact on 22 April. The XIII Corps succeeded in withdrawing across the Danube and together with LXXX Corps, established a defense line south of the Danube and east of the Iller Rivers. Here the enemy fought stubbornly, staging armor supported counterattacks on 25 and early 26 April. In addition, enemy aircraft were very active over the DILLINGEN bridgehead. The delay was only temporary, however, as the line was broken at numerous points late 26 April. The battered enemy which offered opposition only in town, was forced back once more as the area southeast of ULM was cleared. MEMMINGEN (X 8334) was occupied and a bridge over the Werlach River at Y 2156 was secured intact on 26 April. The following day, friendly forces had occupied LEMPTEN and were fighting in AUGSBURG.

XIII SS Corps and LXXXII Corps fared better than their neighbors to the west. After the fanatical fortress stand by LXXXII Corps at NUERNBERG, both corps fell back slowly, offering determined resistance. However, after being outflanked by the armored thrust to DILLINGEN, an orderly withdrawal to the Danube line was begun. Scattered opposition to friendly advances occurred chiefly at road-blocks and towns. DONAUWORTH (T 2317) was cleared on 25 April against negligible resistance but attempts to force further crossings of the Danube on 26 April met strong opposition. The enemy, however, was seriously lacking in artillery and armor and could not effectively delay Allied advances.

Meanwhile, other Allied forces advanced southeast across the Franconian Jura taking REGENSBURG (U 1855) on 24 April.

Driving east, armored columns had crossed into Austria only 35 miles from LINZ (V 8587) and a possible early juncture with the Russian forces. This effectively separated Seventh and First German Armies. Army Group G was left with an almost annihilated Nineteenth and a badly mauled First Army to organize the defenses of Munich and beyond and the defenses of the Bavarian Alps.

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Southern zone: On 22 April the enemy pressed unsuccessful counter-attacks against the PEZURBE Ridge (N 8312); while keeping up a harassing artillery fire on BREIL (N 8004) and SOSPEL (S 7398). Attacks on PEZURBE Ridge were resumed the following day, and friendly positions on MT GROMMANDO (S 7895) were surrounded by the enemy who, however, withdrew of his own accord at midnight. During the night 23/24 April enemy artillery fell on MENTON (S 7786), and throughout the day of 24 April 500 rounds fell in SOSPEL, BREIL and CASTELLAR (S 7890). The next night MENTON and CASTELLAR received 200 more rounds, while other indications placed the enemy's intention to withdraw beyond a doubt. On 25 April friendly forces occupied SAORGE (N 8410), FONTAN (N 8412), AIROLE (S 8497), and VENTIMIGLIA (S 8587), the Germans falling back apparently to SAN REMO (T 0090). Contact was lost between IARCHE and the coast as friendly progress was slowed by heavy mining and demolitions as well as bad weather. On 26 April BRIGA MARITTIMA (N 8917) and TENDA Pass (N 82) were cleared, the Department of ALPES MARITIMES completely liberated; the tempo of the enemy's withdrawal was increasing.

Central zone: Period opened with launching of operation which on 22 April captured MEYRONNES (P 5651), PONTIVE and lower ST OURS (P 5652), encircling Upper ST OURS; a Ski Company took LARCHE (N 3365). The following day Upper ST OURS (P 5654) and adjacent positions were abandoned by the enemy. On 25 April enemy activity diminished markedly in area south of LARCHE Pass, though north of the pass the enemy continued to hold. April 24 and 25 were marked by intense artillery activity, the enemy apparently unloading his stocks of ammunition: 60 rounds of 149 mm and 75 mm fell on LARCHE on the 24th, while BRIANCON (P 4097) received 380 and 75 mm fire. ST OURS, LARCHE and MEYRONNES received 30 rounds 149 mm on 25 April. On 26 April friendly troops entered LARCHE Pass, MT GENEVRE (K 4503) and CESANNE (K 5205).

Northern zone: On 21 April the enemy seized FORCLE Pass and a friendly OP in the Mont CENIS area. Next day a strong patrol was sent against a friendly strong-point at HORTIEDE. From 21 to 25 April enemy works and activity were in evidence in MT CENIS, MT BLANC and BARDONNECHE regions, but on last named date German retreat from MT CENIS became apparent with prodigal expenditure of mortar and artillery shells (including 250 rounds of 149 mm), the sound of heavy demolitions and the abandonment of its positions by the 11th Co of the EDOLO Battalion. The intense artillery fire continued up to 1730B of the following day, when various positions in the FREJUS area (K 42) were found unoccupied.

c. ATLANTIC FRONT

Activity during period was confined to patrolling, visits by lone Recce planes (on 21, 23 and 25 April) and some artillery fire, which fell:

21 April in LA GIGOGNE (T 4826) and PUYROUARD (T 5028)
23 April in LE THOU (T 4826)
24 April in GALON D'ON (Y 3294).

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Intermittent cover, occasioned by breaks in the generally unfavorable weather which prevailed throughout the week, revealed moderately heavy rail activity in the MUNICH area and a continued flow of enemy road traffic to the south and southeast along the 6th Army Group front.

Marshalling yards and rail lines in the MUNICH-AUGSBURG-BUCHLOE triangle were active on 25 and 26 April and indications pointed to the probability that BUCHLOE was serving as a switching point for troops and supplies moving to and from the battle area. A large concentration of railroad cars was seen on the BUCHLOE-MUNICH line on both 24 and 25 April and another group of about 800 cars was sighted on the MUNICH-BAD TOLZ line on the 25th. Marshalling yards in the MUNICH-INNSBRUCK area showed moderately heavy holdings and considerable activity whenever cover of this sector was available. However, the activity seen in this area is by no means surprising. In view of existing circumstances, it is to be expected that concentrated air cover should reveal some activity in this relatively small area, which represents the only remaining portion of the enemy's once extensive communications system.

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Throughout the period represented continued enemy withdrawals at various points along our front. On 25 April approximately 200 vehicles were seen moving south and east from NEUBURG (T 5220) and on the following day reconnaissance planes spotted a 2 mile long vehicular convoy heading south near T 9900. Late cover of 27 April revealed about 500-600 motor and horse drawn transports moving southeast along the road running from SCHONGAU (Y 3617) toward OHLSTADT (D 6299).

6. EFFECT OF ALLIED AIR ATTACKS

A. General. Although effective operations were limited by weather in the past week, air attack on enemy supplies continued. Most of the targets were relatively close behind the front lines and therefore probably important sources for the enemy's defense. Medium bombers of First Tactical Air Force (Prov) attacked two large ammunition installations, one at SCHWABMUNCHEN (Y 35) and the other at EBENHAUSEN (T 71). The former target contained a large storage area and ammunition filling factory, while the latter was principally concerned with filling and had only small storage facilities. Large explosions occurred in both attacks. Ninth Air Force mediums hit a POL depot at SCHROBENHAUSEN (T 60) containing at least seven heavily camouflaged tanks. This attack leaves the MUNICH/FREIHAM POL depot as the sole remaining serviceable depot supplying 6th Army Group's front.

B. Attacks on the Redoubt. Allied air forces also bombed installations within the Redoubt area. The most spectacular of these operations was the Royal Air Force Bomber Command's raid on BERCHTESGADEN on 25 April, when 6 - ton bombs specially fuzed for deep penetration explosions were dropped on Hitler's chalet and the SS barracks nearby; post-raid photography shows bullseyes on these targets. On the same day, the Eighth Air Force hit three marshalling yards in the same general area, and the Ninth Air Force claimed excellent results on the FREILASSING Ordnance depot (Z 93) just outside of SALZBURG. This depot is relatively important, and pre-raid cover on 20 April showed it to be active. On 27 April, Fifteenth Air Force flew up from Italy to attack the marshalling yards at FREILASSING.

C. Effects on Enemy Supplies. The results of strategic and tactical bombing are apparent in the impotence of enemy forces to halt Allied advances. Enemy tanks are far outnumbered by Allied armor, and the desperate gasoline situation frequently restricts them to the role of armored strongpoints rather than mobile attacking forces. Artillery activity appears to be sporadic, and is intense and concentrated only at isolated points. Flak units have been limited since last December to fire at a few specified points during the bomb-run of Allied planes. Shortage of conventional ground artillery pieces and ammunition has resulted in many flak outfits appearing on the scene as ground artillery, and on one sector of the 6th Army Group front during the week of 8-15 April practically all located enemy gun positions were anti-aircraft.

Examples supplied by prisoners of war indicate what this situation means to enemy operations. A battery of 2 Battalion, 235 Artillery Regiment of 198 Infantry Division had no howitzers, and, although new pieces were expected, these failed to arrive and the personnel of the battery found themselves fighting in an infantry outfit a few days later. The batteries of 4 Battalion of the same organization had only 16-30 rounds of ammunition remaining for their flak guns being used as field artillery. Five companies of 316 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 212 Volksgrenadier Division were in similar shape. Only 20 rounds of rifle ammunition and 150 rounds of machine gun ammunition remained to 3 Company, virtually no ammunition was available for the mortars, and each anti-tank gun had a mere 15 rounds.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

Inc #1 - Enemy Disposition.

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
ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 28 1200 B APRIL

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #1 TO
WEEKLY INTELL SUM #32
SCALE 1/1,000,000

DIVISIONS DESTROYED

16	405 (719)
89	716
106	805 (352)

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

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: By Authority of :
: CG, 6th Army Group :
: Initials: L. J. G. :
: Date: 21 April 1945: :
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Declassified per 3 May 72
by [signature]
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 31
Declassified per [signature]
FOR THE WEEK ENDING 21 APRIL 1945
15 July 76

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Army Group G under its new commanding general, Lieutenant General SCHULZ, had insufficient forces to man properly its entire front from east of STUTTGART to the Thuringian Forest. The shifting of some forces from west to east, although temporarily strengthening the junction between First and Seventh Armies, so reduced the effectiveness of its forward positions in the SCHWABISH HALL (S 4658) area that a deep penetration was made on this flank of the Army Group. A gap has been created in this vicinity. The effects of this penetration will probably result in the driving back of the Army Group as far as the Danube River providing its partition and partial destruction does not ensue in the meantime.

The difficult POL situation and lack of adequate motor transport presently existing in this area have greatly restricted the enemy's ability to maneuver. He has been forced to defend selected strongpoints, more in the nature of blocking positions, rather than attempt the establishment of a coordinated defense line.

The rate of attrition in these rapid actions is continuing to be almost equal to the rate of reinforcements and garrisons encountered in Allied routes of advance. Certainly Army Group G can have no other mission than to stand and defend the rapidly shrinking Reich. To give it the mission of protecting approaches to strategic areas would compel it to wage a war of maneuver which is yet further removed from its capabilities.

Seventh German Army was forced to yield much ground along its entire front. The arrival of tanks for 2 and 11 Panzer Divisions and numerous training units for the infantry divisional staffs under its control cannot permit any change in its defensive attitude. The southward withdrawal of First German Army threatens to so weaken the forces protecting the flanks that Seventh Army is threatened with the necessity for independent operations.

First German Army was carrying out a general withdrawal along its entire front at the close of the period. During the week, the army not only continued to receive numerous reinforcements but also carried out considerable regrouping. 2 Mountain Division moved into the ANSBACH (T 0682) area where it incorporated elements of Division ALPEN. 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division was withdrawn from the HEILBRONN sector and placed in Army Group reserve subject to commitment for the defense of NUERNBERG, but failed to arrive in time. 198 Volksgrenadier Division moved from Nineteenth Army to First Army to replace 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division. To add greater strength to the right flank of the army, two newly formed regiments under command of 719 Volksgrenadier Division also appeared southeast of NUERNBERG. These attempts to create order were inadequate against the deep penetrations being made along its entire front. The lunge by US mobile forces completely split the sector of the front held by 198 and 553 Volksgrenadier Divisions and a breach deep into the army rear areas existed at the close of the period. Numerous prisoners of war have indicated that the enemy is intending to establish a defense line on the Danube River line.

Nineteenth German Army has been unable to produce any additional forces to cope with the French exploitation tactics in the Black Forest. This resulted in encirclement of STUTTGART from the west, in conjunction with US troops driving down from the east. The bulk of Nineteenth Army is threatened with annihilation, as its formations are being divided into small ineffective groups. 257 Volksgrenadier Division was split by the French drive to HORB (W 7083); in the area of PFORZHEIM, 2 regiments of 716 Volksgrenadier Division were surrounded and wiped out. 16 Volksgrenadier Division yielded its anti-tank battalion for the defense of NUERNBERG.

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On 19 April, elements of 47 Volksgrenadier were identified attempting to withdraw from the pocket and on the next day available enemy forces were exerting most of their effort to keep the escape routes open while attempting to salvage as much as possible.

b. Capabilities

The enemy can only hope to delay on the Danube River before yielding Upper BAVARIA.

The task of holding the Allied drive towards the south is too large a burden for a weak Army Group and a thrice destroyed army. The enemy may hope to delay along the SUABIAN Alps and FRANCONIAN Hills. However, the positions are already being turned from the west. The only defense line possible to protect BAVARIA is the Danube River line.

Troops in sufficient numbers cannot be made available from the Russian or Italian Fronts until the MUNICH area has been reached. With the initiative clearly in Allied hands, the lack of mobility of enemy forces presently on our front, and the unavailability of reserves will leave the enemy unable to prevent our advance.

2. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (South Central Germany)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: LAUTERHOFEN (T 8093), NEUMARKT (T 7082), FEUCHT (T 5292), EICHELBURG (T 5076), CRAILSHEIM (S 7062), SULZDORF (S 5357), SCHWABISCH Gmund (S 5024), SALACH (S 4711), KIRCHHEIM (S 2606), OBER-URBACH (S 3525), WINNEDEN (S 2232), HOPFIGHEIM (S 1043), MUNCHINGEN (R 9929), LEONBERG (R 9323), BOBLINGEN (R 9310), SIELMINGEN (R 1109), REUTLINGEN (X 0989), DETTENSEE (W 7380), BALINGEN (W 8464), VILLINGEN (W 5340), KNIEBIS (W 4185), TENINGEN (W 0547), SASBACH (V 9048), South along Rhine to Swiss border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ)

(1) Seventh German Army (CG:) (Left Flank Units)

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) kept all three grenadier regiments in close contact throughout the period. The division fell back from SCHWEINFURT to the NUERNBERG area, offering ineffective delaying action. Taking up positions east of the city, it joined with other units in offering stubborn opposition. All major elements of the division were last contacted southeast of NUERNBERG on 19 April. The division continued to absorb miscellaneous units but casualties were heavy in all regiments. The combat infantry strength of the division is difficult to estimate but is carried unchanged at 900.

SS Division NIBELUNGEN (CG:) was first reported to be forming about 25 March in the FREIBURG area of the Black Forest but it was withdrawn northeast to help meet the threat to the NUERNBERG-BAYREUTH area. The assembly area of the division was shown by a captured map to be east of GRAFENWOHR (P 0132) at P 1934. On 19 April, a prisoner from the division was taken at O 6392. The strength of the division has as yet been undetermined due to insufficient information.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col. BOSCHMANN) was relieved in its old sector about 14 April to reorganize briefly and then to be committed in a more crucial area further to the east. A captured document revealed that it was intended for the defense of NUERNBERG. Both Panzer Grenadier Regiments and several auxiliary units were identified east of NUERNBERG on 18 April. The division is now holding the line SE of that city from T 7182 to T 4382. Supported by 653 Tank Battalion, the division launched several unsuccessful small scale counterattacks against our armoured spearhead. 17 SS Division is still in relatively good shape due to the replacements reported last week. Its combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,300.

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719 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) left the HEILBRONN area early in the week and was encountered again north of NUERNBERG where 766 Volksgrenadier Regiment was first identified. This regiment, shown by captured documents to be 719 Division's third organic regiment, came from BERLIN to join the division in the NUERNBERG area. 697 Grenadier Regiment, previously part of 342 Infantry Division, is also reported as part of 719 Division. These regiments had a commitment strength of about 1,000 each but have sustained severe casualties in recent fighting. The division is presently disposed on a line running due south from the city to area T 4382. In conjunction with 256 Volksgrenadier Division, 719 Division forms a spur in the Allied East-West front. Such a position is untenable for any length of time, and both divisions must choose between retreat or annihilation. Some remnants of 416 Infantry and 352 Volksgrenadier Divisions are committed in the same area and are believed to be under command of 719 Volksgrenadier Division. Including these, the division's combat infantry effectives total 1,500.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:). Divisional elements were identified offering stubborn resistance in the ancient defenses of the inner city. After losing practically all its combat troops, 256 Division staff seems to have assumed command of elements 1210 and 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiments, formerly of 159 Volksgrenadier Division, and of some miscellaneous units. Combat infantry strength of this group amounts to approximately 1,000.

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

Division von HOBE (CO: Co. von HOBE) equates with the old Battle Group MASSENBACH or Panzer Verband XIII. Colonel MASSENBACH was relieved of his command due to inefficiency. The new commander was previously with 79 Volksgrenadier Division. Division von HOBE contains mobile and armored replacement units of Wehrkreis XIII. These are organized in Regiments HOLZINGEN, ZEITZ, and HEILBRONN, each of which has three battalion size battle groups. Attached to the division is Panzer Battalion VIERZIG, reported to have 24 Mark V and VI tanks. Division von HOBE is committed east of ANSBACH (T 0681) in general area T 27. Combat infantry strength is now estimated at 1,500.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. UTZ) was bolstered considerably by the absorption of 1 Alpine Regiment. The latter came from Austria where it was formed from convalescents, German Air Force personnel, and stragglers. 2 Alpine Regiment had been identified last week in the CRAILSHEIM area. 2 Mountain Division shifted east from the HEILBRONN region and is now committed south of ANSBACH in area T 06 - T 16. It was in this area that 1 Alpine Regiment and several auxiliary units appeared at the beginning of this period. It had two battalions and was fairly well off in regard to strength and equipment. The original units of the division suffered heavy losses, but the addition of the Alpine Regiment balances these. Combat infantry strength total about 1,800.

616 Division zbV (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER). This division equates with Division RAESSLER of SAAR-PALATINATE fame. Its chief function is to gather, organize, and control straggler groups. It has committed a heterogeneous assortment of such south-west of ANSBACH in area S 97. Their combat infantry strength is roughly 1,500.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. HUMMEL?). According to a captured document dated 2 April, the composition of this division is as follows: Battle Group MOECKEL, Regiment GAVLE, Regiment RATH, and 179 Engineer Battalion. However, some changes have taken place since that date. Regiment GABLE, which is the same as Regiment BAYREUTH, was reported by prisoners now to be under command of 212 Volksgrenadier Division. Regiment RATH has received the number of the old 208 Volksgrenadier Regiment. The patched up division is responsible for the line south-east of ROTHENBURG (S 7788) in area S 87. Its combat infantry effectives do not exceed 1,000/.

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:), has been reorganized on the old numbered regimental basis. Battle Group SACHS became 316 Volksgrenadier Regiment, Battle Group REINWALD 320 Volksgrenadier Regiment. The composition of 423 Volksgrenadier Regiment is not known. The division has two artillery battalions. 2 Alpine Regiment was either absorbed by or attached to 212 Volksgrenadier Division. The division withdrew in a southeasterly direction and is now located around CRAILSHEIM (S 7062) in area S 76. Combat infantry strength including 2 Alpine Regiment is estimated at 1,800.

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(c) XIII Corps (CG)

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KOLB) also withdrew along a southe astern axis and is now holding west of CRAILSHEIM in area S 66. The division had a relatively uneventful week, and casualties were not heavy. 2 Alpine Regiment, previously attached to the division, is now under command of 212 Volksgrenadier Division (see above). Without it, combat infantry strength is approximately 1,200.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) retreated southward in a fairly orderly fashion until our armored breakthrough toward SCHORNDORF (S 3125) - GOPPINGEN (S 4114) outflanked its positions. This left 553 Volksgrenadier Division as the only divisional formation between SCHWABISCH HALL and GOPPINGEN, an impossibly long sector even for a good division. Combat infantry strength of organic elements is about 800.

c. Nineteenth German Army (CG:)

A weak delaying action turned into a complete rout as the Nineteenth Army was split into three separate portions by lightning Allied thrusts. XVIII SS Corps was left with insufficient forces to hold the Black Forest and Rhine fronts, as it was virtually cut off from the remainder of Nineteenth Army. LXXX Corps with elements of LXIV and XIII Corps under its command was desperately trying to extricate its forces from the STUTTGART pocket. LXIV Corps was left with one weak division (257 VG Div) and miscellaneous Volkssturm and replacement units to attempt to hold a north-south line somewhere east of the Neckar.

(a) LXXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BARDE) had moved east at the beginning of the period to take over the sector vacated by 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division. It is now located along the east side of the pocket north of SCHORNDORF. Divisional combat infantry effectives add up to roughly 1,500.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KUEHNE) is composed of three regimental battle groups and an artillery battery. These remnants were withdrawing rapidly at the end of the week. They were last located in area S 23. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,200.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) remained in the same general area south of HEILBRONN. Contact was generally loose throughout the period, and casualties were correspondingly light. Combat infantry strength is still carried at 1,000.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was operating with two organic regiments and some auxiliary units north of STUTTGART. When the threat of our encircling movements became apparent, some divisional elements were hastily shifted to the KIRCHEIM (S 2607)-GOPPINGEN (S 4114) area. However, their defense there was insufficiently prepared and consequently unsuccessful. Earlier rumors of the division's absorption by 16 Volksgrenadier Division were unfounded. Some replacements were received from former elements of 347 Infantry and 559 Volksgrenadier Divisions. Combat infantry effectives now total approximately 1,600.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. TRONPETER). Reports that 726 Grenadier Regiment of this division had been absorbed by 106 Infantry Division were negated by the identification of this regiment in the 716 Infantry Division sector. The old 736 Grenadier Regiment has also been reconstituted from local resources, as well as 706 Grenadier Regiment which first became a regiment of 716 Infantry Division in December 1944. The division drew chiefly on Wehrkreis V replacement pools and on Landesschuetzen units to replenish its combat units. 706 and 726 Grenadier Regiments were both encircled south of PFORZHEIM and practically wiped out by French forces on 19 April. Divisional combat infantry effectives amount to around 800.

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16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) was committed west of STUTTGART in area R 82. In reaction to our attack, it disengaged there and staged a futile counterattack on the flank of the western armored spearhead in area R 80. The division is still in fair shape with organic combat infantry strength totalling 1,200.

465 Mobilization Division (CG:) is a Wehrkreis V administrative staff controlling replacement units. It was recently reported in STUTTGART, its home station. It is probable that the division staff has held back some such units for the defense of the city and its surroundings. Approximately 2,500 troops may have been gathered for this mission. Combat infantry effectives being somewhat lower.

(b) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMELSS)

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) has so far avoided pocketing as it withdrew southeastward under light pressure. The division put up only scattered delaying resistance during the period. It is currently the only major formation that could oppose the eastward expansion of our spearhead to the Swiss frontier in the ASCHAFFENBURG region. Such a task is obviously beyond the division's capabilities. Its present combat infantry strength is estimated to be 1,600.

(c) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER)

106 Infantry Division (CG:), which absorbed the bulk of 708 Volksgrenadier Division and elements of 805 Mobilization Division, spent the week in rather feeble delaying action as it was pushed south through the Black Forest. Toward the end of the period it was spread very thinly along the east-west line between FREUDENSTADT and OFFENBURG. Especially in its present battered condition, the division is certainly incapable of effective resistance. It is supported by remnants of German Air Force Brigade OBERRHEIN, but even including this brigade, combat infantry strength does not exceed 1,200.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEEGER) was contacted south of KEHL during the period. It is composed of three OBERRHEIN Grenadier Regiments (IV, X and XIV) which were constituted from local Security, Landesschuetzen, and Volkssturm units. Included in the division is 291 Battalion zbV, previously under command of 805 Mobilization Division. 405 Reserve Division is being pushed south down the Rhine Valley. Its combat infantry strength is approximately 1,200.

Unidentified Division. An unidentified division staff controlling approximately 6 - 9 infantry battalions is located east of FREIBURG. The unit is not believed to have completely formed as yet nor to have the normal complement of divisional supporting weapons or troops. Its combat infantry strength is estimated at 1500.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP
(Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units)

Nineteenth German Army	15,500
First German Army	<u>15,000</u>
T O T A L	30,500

Available Reserves (Estimated)

Nineteenth German Army	-----
First German Army	-----
T O T A L	<u>30,500</u>

Tanks and SP Guns:

Nineteenth German Army	25
First German Army	<u>95</u>
T O T A L	120

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3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGIER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT FROID (H 4255), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), SAORCE (N 8310), BREIL (N 8003), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions.

Enemy dispositions and capabilities remain unchanged, (see section 3 of Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 30, for week ending 14 April 1945).

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4. OPERATIONS - SOUTH CENTRAL FRONT

Strong resistance in the BADEN Plain and Black Forest at the beginning of the period gave way as OFFENBURG (W 1586) and KEHL (W 0697) were taken on 15 April. LXIV Corps fell back offering only scattered opposition until 17 April when a stand was attempted north of LAHR (W 0970) and across the hills of the Black Forest. A spirited counterattack forced friendly units from NONNENWEIER (W 0272). The stand was only temporary, however, as Allied forces resumed the advance against weak and disorganized resistance. FREUDENSTADT (W 5084) was taken and by the end of the period, the Rhine Plain had been cleared as far south as the KAISERSTUHL. East of the Black Forest, Allied spearheads driving toward the Swiss border had occupied VILLINGEN (W 5340) and SCHNENNINGEN (W 5940). The battered remnants of LXIV Corps were now hopelessly split and unable to offer any organized opposition while XVIII SS Corps controlling Rhine River defenses had become virtually cut off.

LXXX Corps held firm along the Enz River between PFORZHEIM and the Neckar River. Friendly forces seemed less interested in this portion of the front while to the west, Allied forces pushing south through the Black Forest were outflanking the Enz River line. East of the Neckar River, XIII Corps defended stubbornly. Counterattacks and artillery fire held the line intact until 17 April when a slow and well organized withdrawal was begun. Enemy illusions were shattered on 19 April as an Allied armored spearhead from the west captured TUBINGEN (W 9791), crossed the Neckar and reached REUTLINGEN (X 0690). This action again split the remnants of LXIV Corps. Simultaneously, another Allied spearhead drove south from HALL (S 4558), between 198 and 553 Divisions, dividing XIII Corps into two portions. By nightfall, the advance had crossed the Rems River at LORCH (S 4323) and the Fils River west of GOPPINGEN (S 4013), securing intact bridges at both locations. Thus, all of the units of LXXX Corps and portions of LXIV and XIII Corps were rapidly being enclosed in what was doomed to be the STUTTGART pocket. In an attempt to prevent the catastrophe, 16 Volksgrenadier Division was shifted southwest to the WILDBERG (R 7403) area to attack the flank of the TUBINGEN spearhead. Meanwhile, 47 Volksgrenadier Division was dispatched south to the KIRCHHEIM (S 2606) area where it attempted to hold an escape gap for the trapped elements which were hurriedly retreating southward.

Between HALL and NEUSTADT (O 0812), the enemy maintaining a defensive attitude throughout the period, was forced to withdraw under pressure. The Aisch River line was stubbornly defended on 15 April by the enemy dug in along its south bank. The defense appeared well coordinated and received considerable artillery support. However, the following day, Allied units pressed forward and the enemy resumed a well organized delaying action, falling back slowly. ROTHENBURG (S 7889) was cleared of enemy on 17 April and NUERNBERG (O 4000) was being approached from the northwest as the XIII SS Corps continued to offer resistance, using towns as strongpoints. By the end of the period, ANSBACH (T 0682) had been cleared and CRAILSHEIM (S 7062) had been reached as the First German Army fell back in an attempt to cover its exposed left flank.

BAMBERG (O 2648) was cleared on 14 April after short but heavy fighting in which the enemy lost 20 tanks, 8 - 88 mm guns, and 400 killed and wounded. Advances east toward BAYREUTH (O 7556) and south toward NUERNBERG progressed rapidly in spite of strong opposition at scattered points. BAYREUTH was cleared by Allied forces from the northwest on 14 April and the eastern outskirts of NUERNBERG were reached on 17 April. The defense of NUERNBERG was carefully planned and 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 256 and 36 Volksgrenadier Divisions, elements of 719 Infantry Division, and 667 Assault Gun Brigade were allocated for the task. These units defended the city fanatically and although Allied forces approached the city from three sides, every house was stubbornly defended. By 19 April, the enemy in NUERNBERG had been forced into the walled city where remnants held out until late 20 April when it was cleared except for sniper fire. Meanwhile, advances south and east of the city continued to meet strong opposition with continued counterattacks and considerable artillery fire. Although the city of NUERNBERG had been lost, the First German Army was determined to prevent an Allied drive south toward MUNICH.

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a. ATLANTIC FRONT

(1) ROYAN ZONE

The operation which cleared the ROYAN sector took off at dawn, 14 April with an attack on the east side of the area. The enemy promptly withdrew his outposts. These positions upon being occupied by friendly troops were brought under fairly heavy artillery fire. By the end of the day MERSCHERS (Y 4367) was taken and the front line ran from that place to BRIE (Y 4280). After a night of strong enemy artillery fire and small counterattacks friendly infantry advanced on 15 April along highways 730 and 150 to reach ROYAN at 2000B, while armor reached the north and west edges of the town. Troops moving up the ARVERT Peninsula on 16 April penetrated northwest of LA TREMBLADE (Y 2992) and on the following day against sporadic resistance, took LES MATHES (Y 2986) and ETAULES (Y 3387). On 17 April the SAUJON-LA TREMBLADE road was free, and during the night of 17/18 April LA TREMBLADE and RONCE LES BAINS (Y 2897) were taken. By this time the operation had reached the mopping up phase, with a large number of enemy troops holding out in the COBRE Forest at the northwest extremity of the peninsula. Meanwhile, Admiral MICHAELIS and 60 stalwarts defended the last bunker in the south at PONTAILLAC, just west of ROYAN. By 0700B of 18 April all pockets had surrendered and at 0830B resistance officially came to an end at ROYAN. Approximately 6,000 prisoners were captured.

(2) GRAVE ZONE

The line at the beginning of the period ran roughly East-West across the GRAVE Peninsula north of MAYAN (Y 3248). MAYAN was under enemy artillery fire throughout 14 April, while northwest of the town friendly forces occupied PONT DE BREDE (Y 3047), whence they crossed the PERG marshes on the following day to occupy the ground south of VENSAC (Y 3650). During 16 April the advance occupied TALAIS (Y 3550), where the enemy began a last-ditch stand, fighting fiercely to the east of the town. The town itself was attacked by intense artillery fire throughout the night of 16/17 April. On 17 April, however, SOULAC (Y 3061) was reached and at noon the next day LA VERDON was attacked from the west and south, and was taken at 1300B. Against desperate last-minute resistance the peninsula was cleared when the last blockhouse, defended by fanatical officers, surrendered at 2000B on 20 April.

(3) ROCHELLE ZONE

Quiet except for occasional light artillery and patrol activity.

b. ALPINE FRONT

(1) SOUTH ZONE

The enemy quietly evacuated the AUTHION Range (Vic N 7413) on 15 April, falling back to a strongly-mined line of pillboxes east of the Roye River. COLLA BASSA (N 8010) was counterattacked on 16 April, and the next day the enemy retook COLLA BASSA ridge, while the lower ground remained in friendly hands. Just north of COLLA BASSA area friendly troops occupied MAURIAN (N 8111) on 17 April, and moved northward up the slope to seize PEZURBE Ridge, where a German counterattack was repulsed on the following day. On 19 April a stronger enemy counterattack with artillery preparation failed against PEZURBE positions, while friendly troops pushed south and east along the spurs of the COLLA BASSA and took Fort MARTA. Farther to the north LANSFER Redge (N 4839) had been taken on 14 April; here the Italians vainly counterattacked on 17 April and patrol clashes occurred at the place during 19 April. South of the Col of MONTGENEVRE (K 4502) much work and traffic was in evidence during the period, with heavy explosions heard on 16 April.

(2) NORTH ZONE

Works and activity were observed on MT FROID (H 9255) and in the PETIT MT CENIS Pass throughout the period. In the PETIT ST BERNARD Pass occasional mortar and shell fire characterized the period, some digging activity in progress on 19 April.

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5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Extensive cover of enemy activities throughout the period indicated that rail movement was virtually at a standstill throughout the entire Army Group area. Heavy vehicular traffic represented the apparent withdrawal of enemy troops, and the evacuation of civilians and prisoners of war from threatened areas.

Persistent large scale advances by Allied troops choked off one main line after another thus restricting enemy movements to an ever constricting communications net. Early in the period it appeared that the light rail traffic seen on the NUERNBERG-REGENSBURG line and in the vicinity of MUNICH was heading south but in general the activity seen throughout the entire area was so widely scattered and of such light intensity that no definite trends could be ascertained.

In the early half of the period it became evident that rapid gains by American troops were forcing the Germans to withdraw in large numbers throughout the FORCHHEIM (O 4030)-AUERBACH (O 8029)-NUERNBERG area. Approximately 1,100 vehicles of all kinds were seen scurrying to the south and southeast along main and secondary roads in this region on 14 and 15 April. Large groups of civilians likewise appeared to be evacuating this sector and more than 1,000 Allied prisoners of war were spotted amongst the many thousands of pedestrians seen moving to the south on these 2 days. On 17 April several hundred more Allied prisoners were sighted marching to the southeast in the vicinity of VELBRUG (T 8778). Coverage of 20 April revealed widespread vehicular activity in the KIRCHHEIM (S 2808)-WIESENSTEIG (X 4098)-PFULLINGEN (X 1087) zone and here again it appeared that nearly all of the 400-500 vehicles seen were moving or facing southeast. More road traffic to the south was noted in the vicinity of DINKELSBUHL (S 8955) on this same day.

B. Effect of Allied Air Attacks

1. General. Destruction of enemy supplies by Allied air attacks was continued on a wide scale in the past week. Medium bombers concentrated their activities on active ordnance depots, ammunition installations, and POL storage points. At the same time, a heavy weight of bombs was dropped on the Atlantic sector by both heavy and medium bombers.

2. Supplies. In the enemy area which is as yet unoccupied by Allied forces, it is likely that the production of new military equipment is at too low a level to have much significance for front line strength; in the case of gasoline, new production has been virtually eliminated altogether. In this situation, the program of attacks on installation which store and distribute military supplies must steadily be weakening the effort which the enemy can show on the front line, and prisoner of war reports consistently substantiate this thesis.

Four large ammunition depots were effectively hit by medium bombers of First Tactical Air Force (Prov). The extensive installation of STRASS (X 8882) was revisited after a prior attack the week before, and operations were also carried out against the large, active depot at DESCHING near INGOLSTADT, and against smaller installations at ALT DETTELSAU (T 28) and GUNZENHAUSEN (T 26). Destruction was also effected at key enemy ordnance depots. Two of these attacks, at ULM-NEU ULM and KEMPTON, were policing jobs to take care of buildings which had been left standing after earlier attacks. Ordnance depots at TUBINGEN, RAVENSBURG, STRAUBING, AALEN and DONAUSCHINGEN were also bombed. Two POL depots were attacked by Ninth Air Force, a surface depot of 12,000 tons capacity at DEGGENDORF and an underground depot of 100,000 tons capacity at NEUBERG-DONAU, the latter being hit with about 800 tons of bombs. Large oil fires were started in both cases.

3. Atlantic Front. The French offensive in the BORDEAUX area was assisted by large scale bomber operations. Eighth Air Force heavy bombers poured more than 3,000 tons of bombs on LA COUDRE, GRAVES, and ROYAN on the night of 13/14 April, and this was followed by an additional 2,900 tons on 15 April. Medium bomber attacks, principally on the JAFFE and OLERON areas, were carried out during the period of 14-17 April, bringing the total tonnage to well over 8,000 tons.

INCLOSURES

- Inc #1 - Enemy Disposition - 1A
- Inc #2 - Enemy Disposition - 1B

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
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G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
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WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #31

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6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
MARCH 65

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G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #1-8 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #31

REPRODUCED BY ERMA INC.
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
APRIL 45

M. L. S. W. office London

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: By Authority of :
: CG, 6th Army Group :
: Initials: WBA :
: Date: 14 April 1945: :
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FOR THE WEEK ENDING 14 APRIL 1945

A. Enemy Activities in Forward Areas and Units in Contact.

The 6th US Army Group is facing the remnants of Army Group G (First and Seventh Armies) and the Nineteenth Army. Along the Rhine and east to STUTTGART the Nineteenth Army controls approximately 8,000 Fortress troops with 8 artillery battalions and 8,500 combat infantry effectives organized into 10 nominal divisions, supported by 40/50 tanks and SP guns. The mobile artillery consists of 20 divisional battalions, including Anti-aircraft Artillery in ground support role.

Seventh Army, from the NURNBERG area to the BAYREUTH area, has 6 nominal divisions totalling 5,000 combat infantry effectives with approximately 40 SP guns and tanks. Mobile artillery is estimated at 11 battalions, including Anti-aircraft guns.

BY AUTHORITY OF

ARMY	COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVES	ARTILLERY BATTALIONS	TANKS/SP
Nineteenth	8,500	20	40-50
First	15,000	20	100
Seventh	5,000	11	40
TOTALS	28,500	51	180-190

The number of nominal divisions along the remainder of the Western Front is 34, of which 19 are surrounded in the RUHR pocket. None of these troops could disengage rapidly enough to move to the 6th US Army Group front.

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C. Strategic Reserves

1. GERMANY (including DENMARK)

There are no known organized divisional reserves within Germany. Contact with the so-called administrative divisions (e.g. 409, 413, 407) controlling miscellaneous ersatz and training units in the military districts, was forced on the enemy as our lines advanced against their home bases rather than through any movement on their part. A few "name" battlegroups (e.g. HAMBURG, FRANCONIA, THURINGIA, DONAU) were made up of better quality personnel from those localities, but that source is now also practically exhausted. The training areas of Wehrkreis V, VII, XIII, and XVIII, within the zone of advance of 6th US Army Group, will contain a substantial number of combed out personnel who can serve to keep the front line units at fair strength. However, their lack of mobility and materiel will decisively limit their use.

2. NORWAY

Of the 12 divisions in NORWAY, it is now estimated that none can affect the battle on the 6th US Army Group front. Junction of the American and Russian Armies will close their route of approach completely.

3. ITALY

Of the 24 divisions in ITALY, it is estimated that a strategic withdrawal could free 10, at the rate of 2 divisions per month under favorable transportation conditions. However, a Russian advance west of Vienna coupled with Allied pressure in ITALY could prevent movement except on the extremely limited BRENNER pass line.

4. RUSSIAN FRONT

The failure to hold VIENNA cost the enemy not only his last effective mobile force in South East Germany (Sixth SS Panzer Army), but also forced the commitment of an estimated 3 divisions from Italy and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Russian successes in the North and Center have probably permitted strengthening of their forces on the Austrian - Czechoslovak front. It is believed that this front must still enjoy a priority over the Southwestern German front. Therefore, it is highly improbable that any divisions would be released from Austria to the Western Front.

D. Movements and Defenses in Rear Areas.

1. Movement

Road and rail facilities are sufficient in all of Southern Germany to provide the enemy full freedom of movement, given the means of transportation. Good rail and road nets provide several alternate routes within the area, even after access to it may have been closed. However, the shortage of means of transportation and the approach of practically continuous good bombing weather will rapidly cut down his already limited mobility.

2. Defenses

Manmade defenses are available to the enemy in the Siegfried Line along the Rhine, to some extent along the Swiss Border, and most probably facing the Czechoslovak border. None of these should present any serious difficulty to Allied advances in a southerly direction.

E. CONCLUSIONS

The imminent junction of the American and Russian Armies in the DRESDEN area will divide the enemy armies in Germany into two main bodies. The northern armies will deteriorate rapidly in strength, being left with no large source of reinforcements and in terrain unfavorable for defense. In addition, they will be dependent entirely on present stocks of materiel. Finally, they will be subject to immediate encirclement and subsequent partition by strong Allied armored columns.

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The southern group of German armies will be in a more favorable position. Enemy troops retreating from the Italian, Yugoslav, Austrian and Czechoslovak fronts will be initially able to gather together behind natural mountain and river barriers. Forces now in southern Germany can retreat gradually and concentrically behind similar natural terrain barriers along their entire front and with both the flanks and rear protected. With no danger of encirclement, the enemy will be able to maintain a cohesive front line whose strength can for a period actually be increased, as long as the rate of withdrawal is controlled by the enemy. There are undoubtedly within the area already fair stocks of supplies and materiel. As the enemy retreats, more supplies will be available from the stocks being evacuated steadily from outside Germany.

Although there is as yet no firm evidence of a National Redoubt on a long-term planning basis, the turn of military events will actually force upon the enemy a concentration of all his resources in southeastern Germany. It is not believed that the German Army as a whole will surrender. His only capability is still that of retreat and consolidation of forces along a gradually constricting perimeter. However, it is a capability which he can continue to exercise for a considerable length of time, unless his front be pierced simultaneously and deeply at several points.

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2. 6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (South Central Germany)

a. GEUTENREUTH (O 5371), WEISMANN (O 5070), HOLLFELD (O 5454), BAMBERG (O 2547), UNT STEINBACH (O 0247), DOTTENHEIM (O 0009), RUCKART HOFEN (S 7696), CREGLINGEN (S 6699), BLAUFELDEN (S 6280), KIRCHHEIM (S 0350), BIETINGHEIM (S 0240), PFÖRZHEIM (R 7032), SCHOMBERG (R 6621), SPÖLLENHAUS (R 5611), BUHL (R 2910), ONSBACH (R 2100), ZIEROLSHOFEN (R 1201), South along Rhine to border of Switzerland.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSEK)

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY). The division's contemplated move to the northeast did not materialize completely, as Allied pressure forced the commitment of divisional elements in the BAMBERG area. The division put up only scattered resistance against our crossings of the Main River north of BAMBERG. Its sector includes the region to the north of the town. Other elements of the division were reported still further north, at J 1547, on 11 April. The division's strength was raised somewhat by the inclusion of several miscellaneous battle groups. Combat infantry strength of divisional units on our front is 600.

2 Panzer Division (CO: Col. von LAUCHERT). A captured document dated 2 April showed the composition of the division to be as follows: 304 Panzer Grenadier Regiment (BG JUNG, 59 and 71 PG Repl Bns and 300 Pz Repl Bn), Battle Group SCHLUECHTERN, 2 Panzer Grenadier Regiment (1 and 15 PG Repl Bns, BG DOERR, BG PANDORFER), a German Air Force Jaeger Battalion, 38 Panzer Engineer Battalion. Attached were 8 Company 410 and 6 Company 1056 Volks Artillery Corps, Tank Co WILDFLECKEN and 257 Tank Destroyer Company. Elements of the division were identified north of SCHWEINFURT on 8 and 9 April. They are now believed to hold a sector in the LICHTENFELS (O 3777) area. Elements of Panzer Regiment BRANDENBURG are also part of 2 Panzer Division. Combat infantry strength of the division is estimated at 1,000.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHM)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was practically annihilated during the period. Brigadier General FRANZ, its former commanding general, was captured with his Chief of Staff and Artillery Commander. FRANZ stated that only about 100 combat infantry effectives remained. These had been committed between 2 Panzer and 413 Mobilization Divisions. It had the mission of holding the Saale River line.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) kept all three grenadier regiments in close contact throughout the period. Some elements were trapped when friendly troops surrounded SCHWEINFURT. The rest was again in danger of being cut off as the result of Allied crossings on the Main River on both divisional flanks, at N 8561 and N 9361. However, the remains of the division escaped to the BAMBERG area where it was for a second time, within a week, harshly treated. The division attempted to maintain its strength by cannibalizing battle groups, but casualties were heavy in all regiments. Combat infantry strength of remaining units is approximately 900.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER). All major units of this division were identified on 9 April along the Main south of SCHWEINFURT. General PFLIEGER was said to be organizing battle groups and to be integrating these with the few remaining organic elements of the division. The resulting conglomeration had the mission of defending the Main River, particularly to prevent a breakthrough to SCHWEINFURT. Our attacks, which were met by a considerable opposition, forced a withdrawal to a line running from N 8652 to N 8740. The combat infantry strength of the remaining forces is about 700.

413 Mobilization Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORNEMANN) continues to administer Wehrkreis XIII replacement units. Many of these were identified on our front during the period. Some of them were absorbed by field divisions. One group is committed under operational command of 413 Division between COBURG and BAMBERG. Armored and mobile units are under command of Battle Group MASSENBACH (see below). Initial strength of some of the battalions was as high as 900, but casualties were severe, especially in view of the poor calibre and insufficient training of the personnel. Combat infantry strength of Wehrkreis XIII units presently committed under tactical control of 413 Division is approximately

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Battle Group MASSENBACH (CO: Col. MASSENBACH) is also known as "Panzer Verband XIII." comprised of armored and mobile replacement units of Wehrkreis XIII. These are committed directly east of WURZBURG in the general area N 82 - 83. There appears to be no operational dependence on 413 Mobilization Division. Combat infantry effectives amount to around 1,200.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. SCHULZ)

The First German Army reacted strongly in order to create an orderly Order of Battle situation out of chaos. Numerous miscellaneous units, mostly newly arrived replacements were put under the centralized control of its divisions both in line and in reserve. The divisions of the army 9, 16, 79, 212, 246, 553, and 719 Volksgrenadier, 2 Mountain, 17 SS Panzer Grenadier and 409 Mobilization all did satisfactorily and have created a fairly stable line in their sectors of operation. They have managed, so far at least, to delay in an orderly fashion.

(a) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

409 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KLEIKAMP) continued to exercise administrative control over the remaining Wehrkreis IX replacement units. Almost all replacement battalions known to belong to Wehrkreis IX were contacted during the past two periods. Many of them were absorbed by field divisions in a speed-up of the orthodox replacement system. Others were committed independently in the general area of Q 04. Similar to Wehrkreis XIII, most of these battalions had a relatively high initial strength but suffered heavily due to inexperienced personnel and inadequate defensive preparations. The units' mobility is particularly poor. Combat infantry effectives of Wehrkreis IX outfits that are operating independently total about 2,000.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col von HOBE) had been virtually destroyed in the SAAR-PALATINATE. A few remnants of 179 Artillery Regiment, consolidated in Battle Group MOECKEL, were met near the Main bend south-east of WURZBURG. They are presently holding in area N 91. The reorganization of the rest of the division was claimed to be planned. The divisional staff was reported in the general vicinity. Its chief function was to gather and control straggler groups. Strength of elements now in line is about 200. The commitment of reinforcements is to be expected.

19 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) was contacted on 11 April when Battle Group RUECKER (73 VGR) was identified at S 5965. The division had been practically annihilated and remnants were reported absorbed by other units. Its refit is probably very incomplete and combat infantry strength is judged at 1,000.

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG) now functions as a staff coordinating its own remnants with a variety of battle groups (principally BG BAYREUTH, BG SACHS, and SS BG DUERNAGEL). Possibly some of these are destined to become organic divisional elements. The division put up an extremely stubborn fight on the left flank of our CRAILSHEIM salient. Its determined counterattacks, in combination with 9 Volksgrenadier Division, forced our withdrawal from this area. Combat infantry effectives, including these battle groups, add up to approximately 1,800.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KOLB) lost heavily in its powerful counterattacks against the CRAILSHEIM salient. 116 Volksgrenadier Regiment temporarily ceased to exist when its remnants were subordinated to 57 Volksgrenadier Regiment. 36 Volksgrenadier Regiment has long been reported as reforming but has not yet been contacted. 2 Alpine Regiment, composed of 98 and 99 Reserve Mountain Battalions in GARMISCH and SONTHOFFEN, is believed to be attached to the division. Combat infantry strength, including the Alpine Regiment, is about 1,200.

(b) XIII Corps (CG:)

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER). Some elements of the division are still believed to be holding along the Nockar River south of HEILBRONN. The staff, however, shifted eastward and is now responsible for the line south of the Kocher River in the area S 37 - S 47. The division defended both the Jagst and the Kocher River lines with determination. Its strength was bolstered by the absorption of several battle groups. Regiment ROSENHEIM is probably attached. Including this attachment, but excluding elements remaining in the HEILBRONN area, combat infantry effectives add up to about 1,500.

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17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col. KLINGENBERG) is once again in relatively good shape, having received a large number of replacements from the depot units of 1, 9, and 12 SS Panzer Divisions. Most of these are extremely young. However, their fanaticism compensates for their age and lack of training. The division stubbornly contested our crossings of the Jagst and Kocher Rivers. It was supported by a number of tanks and assault guns probably belonging to 653 Tank Battalion (GHQ). Combat infantry strength, including the attached Battle Group NORD, is estimated at 2,500.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KUEHNE) shifted its few remaining elements to the east. It was responsible for a fairly short sector at the confluence of the Neckar and the Jagst, later of the Neckar and the Kocher Rivers. There are still no reports of replacements from this division. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 400.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. UTZ) was given responsibility for the defense of HEILBRONN, a mission which it executed with considerable élan. Only at the end of the period did Allied forces manage to clear the town. The division was supported by several tanks and self propelled guns and by three Wehrkreis V replacement battalions. The division has not been contacted since the fall of HEILBRONN. Its combat infantry strength, including these battalions, is about 1,800.

719 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) still has only a few remnants to its name. These are committed south of HEILBRONN along the Neckar around S 0555. No replacements have been reported and combat infantry strength is still carried at 400.

c. NINETEENTH GERMAN ARMY (CG: SS. Lt. Gen. KEPPLER)

Reacting to the Allied advance the Nineteenth Army reinforced its right flank by shifting the 716 Infantry Division from the lower Black Forest to the PFORZHEIM area and by committing a new arrival, the reconstituted 106 Infantry Division, previously destroyed on the Eastern Front.

Nineteenth Army presently has control over three Corps: XVIII SS, LXIV, and LXXX Corps.

(1) LXXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN). Remnants of this division were recontacted in Battle Group MEIER on 6 April. In addition to this battle group, the staff apparently controls some elements of 553 Volksgrenadier Division and two Wehrkreis V replacement battalions. These now hold a sector from S 0551 to S 0345. Combat infantry effectives total not more than 1,000.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) is fighting with its back to the Neckar in the general area S 04. Its status has remained basically unchanged as replacements were approximately sufficient to balance casualties. Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,400.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) now consists of two organic regiments and the Fusilier Battalion. The division has stayed in loose contact throughout the period. It was reported to have come under command of 16 Volksgrenadier Division. This, however, lacks confirmation. The divisional sector is in area R 9637. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,000.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL). A captured document dated 2 April shows that 225 Volksgrenadier Regiment also absorbed elements of 137 Mountain Regiment (2 Mtn Div). 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment is composed of the old I Battalion 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 325 and 460 Replacement Battalions. Unit GUGELBERGER contains Wehrkreis Battalion 111 and 16 Fusilier Battalion. 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment is apparently dissolved. The division is responsible for the line east of PFORZHEIM, in area R 73 - 83. Combat infantry strength amounts to about 1,200.

(2) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMEISS)

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) lost its 726 Grenadier Regiment to 106 Infantry Division. 716 Division, uncontacted since the end of the COLMAR pocket campaign in February, has been partially reconstituted by the description of Landesschuetzen, Volkssturm, and other miscellaneous units. The division's main line of resistance was given in a captured document as being in the

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PFORZHEIM to NEUENBURG (R 6328). This corresponds very closely to the line currently held by the division. Combat infantry effectives are estimated to be 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) received considerable replacements from the Volkssturm and combed out its own service troops. The division put up a rather feeble defense as it was pushed southward from south-east of KARLSRUHE to south-east of RASTATT during the week. Its sector was curtailed in the west by the commitment of 106 Infantry Division. Brigadier General SEIDEL, the former division commander, was killed in action. The Engineer Battalion was committed as infantry. The divisional Assault Gun Company was reduced to 4 Jagdpanther. Combat infantry strength is about 1,500.

106 Infantry Division (CG:) made its debut on the Western Front last week. It had been destroyed in the east and was partially reconstituted by the absorption of 726 Grenadier Regiment of 716 Infantry Division, 728 Volksgrenadier Regiment of 708 Volksgrenadier Division, and miscellaneous units from the Black Forest. Included in these is XVIII Grenadier Battalion OBERRHEIN of 8 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN, previously reported in Brigade BAUER. Possibly all of Brigade BAUER has been absorbed by 106 Division. The division forms Nineteenth Army's anchor to the Rhine. So far its performance has not been inspiring. It fell back readily under Allied pressure. Divisional combat infantry effectives add up to about 1,500.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) is still out of contact. As the sector which it was believed to hold has been overrun by friendly troops, the division's continued existence is doubted.

(3) XVIII SS Corps (CG:)

This Corps has probably assumed administrative and operational control of all the SIEGFRIED Line remaining in German hands opposite French Alsace.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKMENN) is known to have lost its 728 Volksgrenadier Regiment to 106 Infantry Division and elements of its Engineer Battalion to 405 Reserve Division. These indications point to a dissolution of the division.

405 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEEGER). A document captured on 13 April shows the division to contain 4, 10, and 14 Grenadier Regiments OBERRHEIN and elements of 708 Engineer Battalion. If, as was believed, the division is responsible for the right bank of the Rhine in the KEHL region, its early commitment is to be expected. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,500.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN). No change.

Brigade BAUER (CO:). 8 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN, previously reported as belonging to this Brigade, was encountered in 106 as part of Infantry Division. It is possible that the entire Brigade has been absorbed by 106 Division.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ECKSTEIN). The status of this division cannot be any higher than 716 or 106 Volksgrenadier Divisions previously committed, its personnel having been drawn from the same sources, namely Landesschutzen, Volkssturm and other miscellaneous units. Equipment and training is of low standard.

1005 Brigade (CG: .) No change.

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c. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP
(Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units)

Nineteenth German Army	8,500
First German Army	15,000
Seventh German Army	5,000

T O T A L	28,500
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Reserves: (Estimated)

Nineteenth German Army	2,000
First German Army	-----
Seventh German Army	-----

T O T A L	30,500
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Tanks and SP Guns:

Nineteenth German Army	40-50
First German Army	100
Seventh German Army	40

T O T A L	180-190
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3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGIER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT FROID (H 4255), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), AUTION (N 7412), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

I GENERAL

The enemy's attitude on the Alpine Front remained defensive. However, improved atmospheric conditions and his desire to obtain information on Allied intentions and dispositions may account for his increased patrol activities. While abstaining from any aggressive patrolling on the northernmost flank (MONT BLANC), he displayed increased initiative in the ST. BERNARD area, trying to advance his out-post line into French territory. In the central sector, his patrol activities were centered southwest of MONT GENEVRE.

II ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

The defensive mission to hold the Alpine Front is entrusted to elements of two German Divisions (5 Mtn Div and 34 Inf Div) and two Italian divisions (LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA Divs). With the exception of the 34 Infantry Division which is holding its own sector, elements of the 5 Mountain Division are intermingled in the central and northern sectors with elements of the LITTORIO and MONTE ROSA Divisions.

34 German Infantry Division is occupying the southern sector from GRIMALDI to ST MARTIN VESUBIE with two regiments in line (253 and 107 GR) and one regiment (80 GR) in reserve. In addition, the 34 Replacement Battalion and 34 Engineer Battalion have been identified in that area during the period.

LITTORIO Division. The 3rd Regiment, supported by an AT Company, is holding a portion of the central sector from ST MARTIN VESUBIE to LARCHE while the 4th Regiment intermingled with elements of the German 100 Mountain Regiment is holding the northern sector (Col. Du St BERNARD).

MONTE ROSA Division is stretched along a wide front from COL DE LA GALISE to the AGRGLIO River, intermingled with elements of the German 100 and 85 Mountain Regiments (5 Mtn Div), holding the central sector with two regiments, reinforced by the FOLGORE Parachute Regiment.

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5 Mountain Division (CO: Col. STEETS apparently vice Gen SCHRANK)
It is not quite clear how much of the division has remained on the Alpine Front. Elements of the division were withdrawn in January (the 4th companies of the 1/85 and II/100 Mountain Regiments). Elements of the 100 Mountain Regiment are still being identified in the northern sector (ST BERNARD) and in the central sector (between BARDONNECHIA and COL DE LA GALISE). According to PWs, the division has also under its command two "Gebirgsnachrichten Abteilungen" in addition to the 95 Aufklarungsabteilung. These units, however, have not been identified as yet.

III ENEMY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

The enemy's attitude indicates his determination to hold on the Alpine Front, in order to protect the right flank of his divisions still fighting in the Appenines. He obviously did not feel secure enough to entrust the defense of this important flank to the Italian Command and Italian units. He therefore chose a compromise solution by using Italian units intermingled with German, retaining the German control of that front, however. While holding the present line, the enemy is engaged extensively in building defenses in the rear areas, especially along the axis of penetration leading into the LOMBARDY Plain through the PETIT ST BERNARD, MONT CENIS, MONT GENEVRE and COL DE LARCHE. According to reports of the French SRA, the remainder of the MONTE ROSA Division, until lately located on the APENNINE Front, has been transferred to the PIEDONT area. This change indicates the enemy's intentions to increase the Italian garrison, possibly in view of a further withdrawal of German units which might be badly needed elsewhere in case of a general withdrawal from the APENNINES.

The morale of the Italian troops is definitely at a low ebb. German units display on the whole a better fighting stamina, although German prisoners of war taken lately also show an increased war weariness. This may be partially explained by the high percentage of Austrians in the 5 Mountain Division.

The enemy's capabilities on the Alpine Front are strictly defensive. In view, however, of the questionable value of Italian units and the signs of lowering of morale among German units, the defensive capability of the enemy will be gradually restricted and he may be reduced in the near future to the problem of extricating his German units from the Alpine Front.

4. WESTERN FRENCH FORCES

A. ENEMY ACTIVITIES IN FORWARD AREAS AND UNITS IN CONTACT.

There are approximately 30,000 well equipped and supplied troops located in the 6th Army Group area on the Western Atlantic Front. This total is made up of 15,000 combat infantry effectives, 9,000 artillery and miscellaneous troops, and 6,000 non-combatant troops. These troops are distributed as follows:

	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY AND MISCELLANEOUS	NON-COMBATANTS	TOTAL
POINT DE GRAVE	2,300	1,700	1,000	5,000
ROYAN	4,000	2,500	2,000	8,500
LA ROCHELLE	7,500	3,000	3,000	13,500
ILE DE OLERON	700	800		1,500
ILE DE RE	600	800	400	1,800
	15,100	8,800	6,400	30,300

They are supported by the following Artillery and Anti-Aircraft pieces.

	LIGHT-MEDIUM (155 mm)	MEDIUM-HEAVY (over 155 mm)	ANTI-AIRCRAFT
POINT DE GRAVE	80	6	12
ROYAN	116	5	53
LA ROCHELLE	210	10	93
ILE DE OLERON	34		20
ILE DE RE	43	12	20
	483	33	198

In addition there are a few old-type tanks available at LA ROCHELLE.

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The enemy garrison of German ground, air and naval personnel have been retrained to fit into the newly created situation. The attitude of these troops varies from a strong determination to resist to a desire to desert. However, it is believed that control over all can be managed for some time.

Opposition can be expected to be strongest in the LA ROCHELLE sector, where the garrison has been carefully trained for some time, and reinforcements have recently arrived from ST NAZAIRE. Defensive action in all sectors in the 6th Army Group zone will be initially marked by an enemy withdrawal from his outpost positions to his main defense line for a stand.

Food stocks in the areas are adequate for about two months without further replenishment. However, his ammunition supply can be adequate for a maximum of 15 days of intense fighting.

1. Reserves

The only possible reserves available to the enemy are the garrison troops of ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT. They total about 23,000 and 25,000 men respectively. These troops can be made available in our area only by employing small craft on the sea. However, a serious reduction in the total garrisons of either would make each untenable in the face of available Allied forces. Also the question of supply redistribution will be of paramount importance if a transfer of forces should take place between the garrisons in the Western Atlantic Sector.

2. Conclusion

It is estimated that no large forces will be made available from the ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT Garrisons to augment the troops now in 6th Army Group zone. The enemy's main defense will be based on the well constructed perimeter positions around the critical points.

B. MOVEMENT AND DEFENSES IN REAR AREAS

1. Terrain of LA ROCHELLE Area.

The area occupied by the German armed forces in LA ROCHELLE covers approximately 400 square kilometers. This district is well protected in the north by the swamps of LA SEVERE and in the south by those of DEFOURAS. In the east, swampy valleys run along both sides of the CURE and the AIGREFEUILLE. A ridge-line running northwest-southeast divides the area into two portions and constitutes the only possible axis of attack on the sector.

2. Movement

The rear areas of the enemy controlled sections of Western France are very small and there is little need for motor transport. Communications between all these garrisons in Western France will be carried out by ship as no land communications exists between them.

3. Defenses

(1) POINTE DE GRAVE

The land approach to the POINTE DE GRAVE is defended by an anti-tank ditch, wire and a mine field stretching from the western bank of the Gironde River to the ATLANTIC and completely cutting the defended area from the land. These are supported by anti-tank guns and automatic weapons. Little concrete is present in this defense line. However, the nature of the terrain permits only a few routes of approach, and these are well defended by strong points. The ATLANTIC coast is defended by a number of casemated coastal batteries and underwater obstacles. Apart from a few guns on the northern tip, and a few field pieces, these will not be able to interfere with an attack on ROYAN.

(2) ROYAN

The land approaches to ROYAN are defended by a line of outposts, backed by a belt of minefields completely surrounding the town of ROYAN proper and anti-tank ditch and much wire. These are supported by a number of strong points.

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Minefields are reported surrounding the entire peninsula, and a number of strongpoints are distributed through its northwestern area.

Underwater obstacles and a number of casemated coastal batteries defend the sea approach. Several heavy batteries on the POINTE DE LA COUBRE (N W tip of peninsula) have been reported altered to fire on a 360° angle. Ground sources have later reported them as having been removed.

(3) LA ROCHELLE

LA ROCHELLE is protected against a land attack by an anti-tank ditch doubled by mine fields and barbed wire. Further support is gained by a number of pillboxes, casemated anti-tank guns, and strong points. In the north, several canals form natural anti-tank barriers. A number of pillboxes and artillery casemates form additional strongpoints within the perimeter of the defended zone. There is an additional defense belt cutting off LA PALLICE from the rest of the LA ROCHELLE area. This consists of mine fields, wire and short lengths of anti-tank ditches supported by artillery strongpoints.

The coastal defense is defended by casemated artillery and underwater obstacles.

(4) ILE D'OLERON

Similar to ILE DE RE, this island is protected by under water obstacles and casemated and field batteries distributed along its coast. These are mostly 75 mm, 105 mm, and 155 mm guns. There are no heavy batteries on the island.

(5) ILE DE RE

The defense of this island is aided by underwater obstacles, and casemated coastal and field batteries well distributed along the entire coast. These are mostly of 75 mm to 105 mm caliber with a few 155 mm guns. However, the northwestern tip has several batteries of heavy guns.

CONCLUSIONS

Complete isolation of the garrisons in the Atlantic ports delimits the enemy's capabilities. With no possibility of reinforcements or freedom of maneuver, the enemy can only resist the siege by manning his prepared defensive positions. The enemy may be expected to resist strongly in order to protect these submarine bases, but his will to resist should crack before he has expended his full resources.

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5. OPERATIONS

a. RHINE FRONT

The front along the Rhine from BASLE to STRASBOURG remained generally quiet. No patrol activity was reported and artillery fire was very light. The German Nineteenth Army was busily occupied redispersing troops in an attempt to meet the Allied thrust driving into the Black Forest from the north.

b. SOUTH CENTRAL FRONT

As the period opened the advance of friendly troops was slowed by strong resistance from Siegfried positions south of MORSCH (R 4040) and ETTLINGEN (R 4938). Opposition weakened somewhat on 8 April as that portion of PFORZHEIM, north of the Enz River, was cleared. LXIV Corps offered stubborn opposition to the crossing of the Enz River at DURRMENZ (R 8139) on 8 April and attempted to maintain an intact line along the river. South of KARLSRUHE, the Black Forest was entered against disorganized resistance. RASTATT and the Murg Canal were outflanked and the city was cleared on 12 April. By the end of the period, the Rhine plain opposite STRASBOURG had been reached. BADEN BADEN had been cleared and the Black Forest had been penetrated as far south as GAUSBACH (R 4610). Along the Neckar, LXXX Corps had fallen back but was defending stubbornly the approaches to LUDWIGSBURG (S 0633) and STUTTGART (S 0520).

East of the Neckar River and south of the Jagst River, the enemy defended stubbornly. Reinforcements were hurriedly brought forward and repeated attempts made to close the CRAILSHEIM corridor. Coordinated air-ground attacks were made and on 9 April, on which day 101 enemy aircraft were reported over the area. As a result of heavy enemy opposition, Allied forces withdrew from the corridor early 11 April. HEILBRONN was stubbornly defended until 11 April when the enemy withdrew to take up positions east of the city. The Jagst River line was held until 9 April when an orderly withdrawal was made to the Kocher River. Here the enemy held until 12 April when expanding Allied bridgeheads once again forced the enemy into a withdrawal to maintain the integrity of his line.

The Main and Tauber Rivers south of SCHWEINFURT (N 7983) were strongly defended by miscellaneous battle group formations. In spite of the continued arrival of reinforcements of men and armor and a determined defensive attitude, enemy forces were pushed back from ten to fifteen kilometers in this area during the period. SCHWEINFURT was outflanked from the north but the enemy put up a stubborn defense of the city. Heavy resistance from small arms and 88 mm artillery delayed friendly forces on the approaches but the city was entered on 11 April. After heavy house - to - house fighting during the entire day, enemy resistance finally collapsed. East of SCHWEINFURT, the Main River was crossed from north to south on the morning of 14 April against short-lived but heavy opposition. In this action, the enemy lost 1,820 prisoners, 400 killed and wounded, and 20 tanks and 8 X 88 mm anti-aircraft guns were knocked out.

As the period closed, the enemy was stubbornly trying to hold across the Black Forest and the Neckar - Main Hills, but the superiority of friendly forces was making his task increasingly difficult. German opposition became weak and disorganized as Allied spearheads swept southeast between BAMBERG and BAYREUTH.

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A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Although poor weather hindered observations at the opening of the current period, clearing skies afforded good coverage of enemy activity throughout the greater part of the week. Persistent Allied advances forced the enemy to shift his previously used routes for troop and supply movements to roads and railroads further to the east.

Marshalling yards and rail lines throughout the BAMBERG (O 2649) - AUGSBURG (Y 3580) - REGENSBURG (U 2055) area were reported active on nearly all days of the period, but it did not appear that any large scale connected rail moves were taking place. In fact, except for the 11th of April when most of the movement seen on the NURNBERG - REGENSBURG rail line was to the southeast, it seemed that only normal two way traffic of supplies and reinforcements was being maintained. However, the widespread vehicular activity observed throughout this same area on 9, 10 and 12 April presented an entirely different picture. In this case it was obvious that the bulk of traffic, which was largely horse-drawn, was moving east. Much of this activity appeared to be of a civilian nature, possibly indicating large scale evacuation throughout this region. The fact that several large groups of pedestrians were seen moving in an easterly direction along roads in this sector on these same days adds to the belief that many civilians are fleeing this area. On 10 April, a total of approximately 300 horse-drawn transports was observed moving mostly northeast in the vicinity of DONAUWORTH (T 2417) and on 12 April about 600 other vehicles, the greater part of which were civilian horse-drawn carts, were seen moving east in the area centering about SCHESSLITZ (O 3559). Some military vehicles and scattered troop convoys appeared to be intermixed with these civilian transports.

Moderately heavy rail and road activity was noted throughout the STUTTGART - AALEN (T 7328) - ULM (X 6880) area on 10 and 11 April probably representing the movement of some reinforcements and supplies for enemy forces in that region. Night fighters also spotted heavy road traffic moving west toward STUTTGART during the night of 8 - 9 April and aerial reconnaissance reports of 9, 10 and 11 April revealed widespread activity in the STUTTGART, AALEN and ULM marshalling yards. The heaviest military activity was seen in this sector on 11 April when 3 military rakes, 10 groups of scattered boxcars and 6 scattered trains were sighted on the STUTTGART - ULM line.

7. EFFECTS OF ALLIED AIR ATTACKS

Tactical and strategic air forces both operated in the Sixth Army Group area in the past week. These attacks, which were carried out on a large scale and over a wide area, hit the enemy at his most vulnerable points: Oil, ammunition, and ordnance. In addition to bombardment of specific supply targets, a number of marshalling yards were hit, all of which have been shown by recent reconnaissance to be centers of rail activity.

Most of the important POL storage depots in southern GERMANY were included in the program of attacks. In the opinion of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee on Oil, the virtual elimination of gasoline producing and refining facilities has greatly increased the importance and activity of storage capacity, and the air operations of the past week should have a significant effect on the enemy's already sorry gasoline position. The Eighth Air Force hit four major active POL depots well to the east of our front and may have affected enemy operations against the Russians as well as against the advance from the west. Medium bombers of First Tactical Air Force attacked the two most important active depots close in to the Sixth Army Group front, GEISLINGEN (S 5505) and WEISSENHORN (X 7970), with considerable success. Following the attack on GEISLINGEN on 10 April, smoke was seen to a height of 10,000 feet, and large explosions were experienced over WEISSENHORN.

Two of the enemy's largest ammunition installations in southwest GERMANY were severely blasted by medium bombers. The storage area at KLEIN ENGSTINGEN (X 1677), south of REUTLINGEN (X 0988), was twice more attacked following the bombardment of the previous week. Photographic cover shows 460 hits within the area, with extensive damage to shelters, warehouses, rolling stock, and the road and rail network. Large tonnages were also dropped on STRASS ammunition depot and filling plant in the ULM (X 6780) area. This depot is reported to have loaded 70 - 100 rail cars daily, or the equivalent of about 1500 tons. Photographic cover had shown it to be an elaborate complex of military buildings, warehouses, barracks, and 100 ammunition shelters. A filling-assembly plant is also believed to be operating in this area.

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These attacks on large enemy ammunition installations are expected to affect ammunition supplies in the field almost immediately, as it is believed that the enemy is living off his depot stocks more than now production at the present time.

The effectiveness of attacks on ordnance depots is probably on the same order of magnitude; prisoner of war reports of weapon shortages, particularly among replacement troops, are very frequent. In the past week, ordnance depots on the Sixth Army Group front were attacked by heavy bombers at LANDSHUT (U 2603) and REGENSBURG (U 2055), and by the Ninth Air Force at AMBERG (O 9901) and KEMPTEN (X 9306).

The attacks on the marshalling yards were well-timed. All of the major yards hit had been reported by reconnaissance as centers of heavy rail activity. On 11 April, the Eighth Air Force bombed the yards at LANDSHUT (U-2603), INGOLSTADT (T 7225) (T 7225), TREUCHTLINGEN (T 3244), and DONAUWORTH (T 2417); on the same date the INGOLSTADT yard was seen to be active with four 45-car trains. Also on 11 April, the Royal Air Force hit two yards in south GERMANY, including almost 500 tons on NURNBERG (O 4200), which has been a hub of activity for over a week.

Eugene L. Harmon
EUGENE L. HARMON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES


- #1 Inc - Enemy Disposition - A
- #2 Inc - Enemy Disposition - B
- #3 Inc - Tab 2

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
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ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 14 1200 B APRIL

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #1A TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #30

REPRODUCED BY ENR 144
6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
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
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G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCLOSURE #1-B TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #30

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6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
APRIL 45

AS OF 14 1200 8 APRIL

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ENEMY DISPOSITION
 AS OF 14 1200 B APRIL

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G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
 ENCLOSURE #2 TO
 WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #30

REPRODUCED BY ENBA SEC.
 6TH ARMY GROUP HQ
 APRIL 45

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

P 328

By Authority of :
:CG, 6th Army Group :
:Initials: :
:Date: 7 April 1945:
:

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 29

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 7 April 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Army Group G controls two armies which have totally inadequate forces and, in addition, very weak flank contacts between themselves and with the adjoining armies. It is also confronted with the impossible task of holding every inch of German soil in order to prevent those penetrations into THURINGIA and BAVARIA which would demonstrate to the German people the uselessness of further struggle.

The encirclement of Army Group B and the RUHR has created a military situation more unfavorable, if possible, than presently exists in South Central Germany. The result will be that Army Group G's priority for reinforcements will continue to be secondary. Only Wehrkreis XIII and VII remain to be combed out. The arrival, or even the reconstitution, of large armored forces daily becomes less of a potentiality as the productive capacity of the nation shrinks.

Seventh German Army, showing signs of some strength and organization only in the THURINGIAN Forest, is too weak in mobile forces to hold intact its thin, crust like line against renewed and more determined Allied actions. The left flank of the army, extending to the vicinity of NURNBERG - WURZBURG, is continuing to fall back after the capture of ASCHAFFENBURG. The primary task of the army now is to maintain a cohesive front and contact with its flank neighbor. Its mission is to protect the great industrial center of DRESDEN - LEIPZIG - ERFURT.

First German Army has not received enough mobile forces to cut off the US tank units reaching CRAILSHEIM (S 7062), nor even sufficient effective infantry forces to organize positions which bear some relation to each other. Its left boundary has undoubtedly been shrunk to the area of STUTTGART from the Rhine River in order to assume a more positive control of its lower formations. The rapidly expanding front line becomes daily more brittle and, with enemy's uncertainty as to the stability of his right flank, preservation of the army will be the only mission possible.

Nineteenth German Army, which only last week was under Army Group G, has undoubtedly returned to an independent army status responsible only to C in C West. Coupled with its responsibility for reforming three divisions, it has found French and US forces approaching terrain features whereby its SIEGFRIED Line positions and the Black Forest were slowly being turned or at least outflanked. Certainly the army cannot hope to receive troops and reinforcements of any important size which will enable it to maintain its present positions. Slow disintegration will bring about its end.

b. Capabilities

The enemy is completely restricted to a single capability: to delay his defeat.

Enemy forces south of the line FULDA - ERFURT are incapable of preventing further large areas of the homeland from being overrun by Allied forces. While armor in sufficient concentration is unavailable to combat friendly tank spearheads, the

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limited infantry forces on line are stretched beyond the point where adequate control can be maintained. The existence of strategic reserves within Germany is now certainly no longer credible.

The highest priority for reserves coming into the west must go to the most critical sector, namely the WESER RIVER - ALLER RIVER - MITTELLENNAD CANAL - ELBE RIVER Line in order to reestablish a western front in that area. There is a slight possibility that a few divisions might come from the Russian Front. Not, however, Sixth SS Panzer Army for the time being at least. For there are excellent indications that SEPP DIETRICH is commander of the VIENNA Fortress Garrison with his four panzer divisions, two of which (9 SS Pz and 12 SS Pz Divs) are badly mauled.

The only reserves available for the forces presently in line south of ERFURT are the troops remaining in Wehrkreise immediately to their rear. These are definitely becoming as limited in number as they already were in quality.

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6TH ARMY FRONT (South Central Germany)

a. At the close of the period, the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: WURGHAUSEN (J 1207), RITSCHENHAUSEN (H 9117), OBERSFELD (N 5460), ASTHEIM (N 7843), REPPERNDORF (N 7130), RODELSEE (N 8028), HERRNBERCHTHEIM (N 7812), MARKELSHEIM (S 5199), SCHAINBACH (S 6972), CRAILSHEIM (S 7062), MAULACH (S 6562), RENGERSHAUSEN (S 4491), WIDDERN (S 2281), BAD WIMPFEN (S 0371), HEILBRONN (S 0760), BRACKENHEIM (R 9753), MICHELBAACH (R 8852), KIESELBRONN (R 7438), BROTZINGEN (R 5545), ETTILINGENWEIER (R 4736), NEUBURGWEIER (R 3840), South along Rhine to Swiss Border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSER)

The known corps under this Army Group are reduced to four in number as a result of Nineteenth Army taking over XC and LXXX Corps west of the Neckar River. They are XIII Corps, XIII SS Corps, LXXXII Corps, and LXXXV Corps. The continued existence of LXXXIX Corps is doubted.

352 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was not contacted during the period. It is believed that whatever remained of its combat elements was overrun at the end of the last period at WALLDUERN (N 1810) in our rapid drive toward MURZBURG.

(1) Seventh German Army (CG:) (Left Flank Units)

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER). A battle group of this division was identified on 5 April south of FULDA. Prisoners state that this is a straggler group of 2-300 men which escaped from the east bank of the Rhine between the Main and Lahn River. They are presently consolidated under command of 11 Mountain Regiment. The rest of the division was pocketed in the vicinity of N 09.

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY). 1209 Volksgrenadier Regiment of this division was absorbed by 256 Volksgrenadier Division. The rest of 159 Division, bolstered by some miscellaneous units, is still believed to be operating independently south east of WILDFLECKEN in area N 59. However, there are indications that it is moving northeast via COBURG (O 2989). Organic infantry combat strength, excluding 1209 Regiment, is estimated at 500.

2 Panzer Division (CO: Col von LAUCHERT). An undated captured document reveals that some remnants of the division were absorbed by 256 Volksgrenadier Division. Nevertheless, the division still appears to be operating independently, as evidenced by the identification of 38 Panzer Engineer Battalion (2 Pz Div) on 6 April. The division's present location is believed to be in area N 48. Combat infantry effectives of remnants are estimated at 500.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HELIM) distinguished itself in its stubborn defense of ASCHAFFENBURG from where it withdrew only after a prolonged and costly fight. Casualties were severe but were balanced by replacements. At the end of the period, the division was holding a sector around N 4070 and had combat infantry strength of approximately 700.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) appears to be still operating independently despite previous reports of cannibalization. 1209 Volksgrenadier Regiment of 159 Volksgrenadier Division, identified at N 2970 on 4 April, is claimed by a prisoner to be under command of 256 Volksgrenadier Division. In addition, the division swallowed up some elements of 2 Panzer Division (by captured document). No organic elements of 256 Volksgrenadier Division were identified during the period. Remnants of 256 Volksgrenadier Division and of absorbed units are estimated at 1,000 combat infantry effectives.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER). Remnants of this division were reported fighting under 47 Volksgrenadier Division east of KARLSRUHE. This conflicts with earlier statements and documentary evidence placing the divisional headquarters and remnants in the ASCHAFFENBURG area. Since no recent contact with divisional elements has been made in the KARLSRUHE area, it is probable that only scattered combat units were, in fact, subordinated to 47 Volksgrenadier Division. 416 Infantry Division staff is still in the general region of N 56.

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(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

Through skillful coordination of the skeletal divisions remaining at its disposal with a large number of replacement, miscellaneous general headquarters, and Volkssturm units, First Army was able to temporarily reconstitute its forces sufficiently to make them capable of limited defensive actions. Though still too weak to block a full-scale Allied thrust, the Army is capable of staging limited counterattacks against armored spearheads and of extracting a fairly high price for our capture of strategically vital features. A much more determined defensive attitude, particularly on the Army's left flank, was evidence of the effort at reorganization that is taking place.

409 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KLEIKAMP) has administrative control over all remaining Wehrkreis IX replacement units. 15 replacement battalions of Wehrkreis IX were identified during the period by Seventh and Third US Armies. Two of them (88 and 388 Grenadier Replacement Battalions) were absorbed by 1209 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 159 Volksgrenadier Division. Some were apparently subordinated to the field divisions, and yet another group of battalions had the independent mission of defending part of the LOHR (N 3156) region. The commitment of some battalions as a group suggests the possibility that 409 Divisional Staff was in operational as well as administrative command. However, it is more likely that the staff of one of the destroyed field divisions eventually assumed the operational command of its contribution. Present combat infantry strength of Wehrkreis IX units facing 6th Army Group is estimated at 2,000. A few more battalions, at best, remain to be committed.

413 Mobilization Division (CG:) is in administrative command of the remaining Wehrkreis XIII training and replacement units. A group of these, including the ETTLINGEN Non-commissioned Officer School, is committed east of WURZBURG in area N 63. Wehrkreis XIII has been milked of most of its replacement units during the past month. It is doubtful that more than a few are still uncommitted. Combat infantry strength of Wehrkreis XIII units facing 6th Army Group is estimated at 1,500.

(a) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:). On 29 March, the division was reported to have been absorbed by 246 Volksgrenadier Division. However, elements were identified on 4 April at N 5209. Furthermore, prisoners state that about 2,000 replacements were received from Wehrkreis XII and from BAVARIA. A part of these probably equate with Regiment BAYREUTH (Strength: 6-700) and Battle Group SACHS. The division is presently located south of WURZBURG in area N 50 - N 60. In view of recent casualties, combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,000.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Col. KOLB) was practically destroyed in the PALATINATE. On 6 April the following identifications were made: 57 Volksgrenadier Regiment at S 4491; 116 Volksgrenadier Regiment and 9 Artillery Regiment at S 4696. Apart from stragglers, these represent the first contact with the division east of the Rhine. As yet no details regarding reorganization and replacements are available. Combat infantry strength is tentatively estimated at 1,000.

(b) XIII Corps (CG:)

Lt. Gen. COUNT von ORIOLA, Commanding General of XIII Corps, was captured on 31 March. A captured document dated 29 March located the Corps Command Post at S 2172 and puts 16, 19, 246, 553 Volksgrenadier, and 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions under XIII Corps control. 16 Volksgrenadier Division has left the Corps while 719 Volksgrenadier Division has come under command of the Corps.

19 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) committed its remnants in area S 39 at the start of the period. Later, these were reported absorbed by 2 Mountain Division. 19 Volksgrenadier Division, weak from the outset, lost 1,700 prisoners west of the Rhine after 13 March. 2 Mountain Division was enriched by not more than 300 combat infantry effectives. These are all that are believed to have survived the debacle west of the Rhine River.

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17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: SS Col. KLINGENBERG).
The division received considerable replacements from PRAGUE and ALTKIRCHEN, the division assembled the bulk of its units at BAD MERGENTHEIM (N 4700) on 1 April.

Most of the new personnel was very young and insufficiently trained but had a high morale. The division is now committed north of HEILBRONN in area S 17, where both 37 and 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiments were identified on 7 April. An undated captured document shows 653 Tank Battalion as attached. 17 SS Division has always had a high replacement priority and its refit is probably well under way. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,500.

719 Infantry Division (CG: . . .). Elements of this division were contacted in the KARLSRUHE area as late as 4 April. However, a shift to the east apparently took place, because on 5 April Battle Group KREBS, containing the remnants of 719 Division, was identified at R 9972. This battle group, incorporating the remaining combat infantry effectives of the division, is believed to contain about 400 men.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) was decimated in its futile attempt to contain the OPPENHEIM bridgehead on the Rhine. 1119 and 1120 Volksgrenadier Regiments were identified at S 2090 on 5 April, confirming the division's presence in this area. On 6 April, remnants of both of these regiments were reported absorbed by 1121 Volksgrenadier Regiment. Each regiment had a commitment strength of about 500 combat effectives. At present, divisional combat infantry strength is not above 600.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) is currently holding the line around EPPINGEN (R 8560) flanked by elements of 2 Mountain Division on both sides. However, prisoners stated on 6 April that division was to withdraw east of the Neckar River. 305 Grenadier Regiment was identified on 31 March, 308 and 326 Grenadier Regiments on 2 April at R 6683. 305 Grenadier Regiment, which was committed for the first time since its lengthy reformation at KARLSRUHE, was stated to have 5-600 combat effectives. The other regiments, battered in the PALATINATE, are less well off. Divisional combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,400.

c. Nineteenth Army (CG:)

(a) LXXX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. BAYER)

2 Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. UTZ) was last identified on 5 April, at which time it was operating in two battle groups. The first, including elements of 136 Mountain Regiment, was contacted at S 0665; the second, including 137 Mountain Regiment, at R 7062 and R 7565. Several conflicting reports of reshuffling within the division remain to be clarified. The absorption of 19 Volksgrenadier Division by 2 Mountain Division is confirmed. Some replacements are also known to have been received from AUSTRIA. Nevertheless, the division is still believed to be in poor shape. Its combat infantry strength totals approximately 1,000.

246 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KUEHNE) is operating in small battle group formations west of HEILBRONN, around area R 9560. No reports of replacements have been received and the division is still believed to be extremely depleted. Combat infantry strength is judged at 400.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von der MUEHLEN) has not been identified since the beginning of the week. Its depleted state and lack of contact would indicate that the division is either dissolved or out of line for refit; 696 Grenadier Regiment of 340 Infantry Division, previously reported attached to 559 Division, was decimated toward the end of March and the combat elements of the division have not been identified since. Organic combat infantry remnants of 559 Volksgrenadier Division amounted to about 400 after the SAAR-PALATINATE Campaign.

(b) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was considerably strengthened by the absorption of remnants of 79 Volksgrenadier and elements of 347 and 416 Infantry Divisions. In addition, 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment was reorganized at HOCKENHEIM (R 5980) with convalescents and recent inductees, raising its strength to 400. On 31 March, the division was ordered to retreat to the line BRUCHSAL (R 6259) - MUNZESHEIM (R 7158) - MENZINGEN (R 7460). It has since been forced to withdraw its left flank somewhat further south and is currently holding from R 7053 to MENZINGEN. Prisoners state that the Anti-Tank Battalion has lost all its pieces and that the Artillery Regiment is very depleted. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 1,200.

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257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) rebuilt two regiments (457 and 466 VGRs) with replacements that arrived from DRESDEN. Each regiment has two battalions with an average company strength of 80-100. However, the number of companies per battalion is varying. The division was reidentified for the first time since the SAAR-PALATINATE operation on 2 April at LEOPOLDSHAFFEN (R 4655). It is now responsible for the line from south and south-east of KARLSRUHE probably extending as far west as the Rhine River. Combat infantry effectives total around 1,500.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) was partially rehabilitated by the absorption of remnants of 905 Volksgrenadier Division. 223 Volksgrenadier Regiment also received replacements from 476 Grenadier Replacement Battalion, DRESDEN. The division is responsible for the line from WEINGARTEN (R 5850) to R 7053. Its combat infantry strength is judged to be 1,200.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) has not yet been contacted and is still believed to be manning defenses along the Rhine in the RASTATT area. Combat infantry strength estimate is 600.

905 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:). The entire remnants of this division were absorbed by 16 Volksgrenadier Division.

(c) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. GRIMMEISS)

The Corps remains responsible for the sector from KARLSRUHE to area V 69.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) continues to hold a sector along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKLENN) is still located in the ETTENHEIM area (W 0561). It is probably reforming there.

(d) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER)

This Corps still controls the southern part of the BASLE - KARLSRUHE line.

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN) no change.

Brigade BAUER (CO:) also reported as a Panzer Brigade, is claimed by good sources to be located between 805 Mobilization and 716 Infantry Divisions.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) was located by a reliable source in the MUELHEIM (V 9112) area. It is believed to be reforming there. It is probably simultaneously responsible for a sector along the Rhine in that region. The division is said to contain a large proportion of Volkssturm troops and is not believed to be far advanced in its reorganization.

1005 Brigade (CO:). More recent reports cast doubt on the possibility of 1005 Brigade's equation with Brigade BAUER. In one case, a good source mentions both independently and at different locations.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. ECKSTEIN ?). A reliable source places the division north of the Swiss border with headquarters possibly at LOERRACH. The division is stated to contain much Volkssturm personnel. Equipment is claimed to be generally poor. Its readiness for action as a division is far from complete or satisfactory.

d. Twenty-Fourth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

No change in mission has yet been ascertained.

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e. ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6TH ARMY GROUP

Combat Infantry Effectives of Divisional Units: *

Seventh German Army	4,000
First German Army	7,500
Nineteenth German Army	10,500
	<hr/>
T O T A L	22,000

Reserves: (Estimated)

Seventh German Army	-----
First German Army	-----
Nineteenth German Army	2,000
	<hr/>
T O T A L	24,000

Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh German Army	30-40
First German Army	40-50
Nineteenth German Army	15-20
	<hr/>
T O T A L	85-110

(*) Excluding miscellaneous non-divisional units.

(**) Including only elements facing 6th Army Group.

3. 6TH ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROGIER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEUAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MATRIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions

Information from partisans confirmed the presence of I Battalion 100 Mountain Regiment (5 Mtn Div) and III Battalion 4 Alpine Regiment (Littorio Div) in the BARDENECHE area. Prisoners of war identified the VARESE Battalion (4 Alpine Regt, Littorio Div) in the vicinity of PETIT ST BERNARD. The 4 Alpine Regiment in the AOSTA Valley is being reinforced by a training battalion of 800 convalescents from VERCELLI (J 65). The movement of elements of the MONTE ROSA Division into the French border region has continued and should be nearing completion. Rumors of the departure of 34 Infantry Division from the coastal region have not been confirmed by prisoner of war interrogation.

b. General

The enemy continued work on defenses and remained alert along the entire front. Limited Allied operations on 31 March in the PETIT ST BERNARD area met with success only after overcoming determined opposition. Enemy's intentions are purely defensive but harassing raids may be expected.

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4. OPERATIONS

a. RHINE FRONT

The front along the Rhine from BASLE to KARLSRUHE remained relatively inactive. Artillery fire was very light and patrols infrequent. The enemy was apparently no longer anxious concerning Allied intentions along this portion of the front.

b. SOUTH CENTRAL FRONT

At the beginning of the period, stubborn resistance was being encountered South of the Neckar River in the HARDT Woods. Opposition was light East of the ODENWALD while determined enemy forces operating under 36 Volksgrenadier Division and 416 Infantry Division continued a stubborn defense of the ASCHAFFENBURG area. Early on 31 March, a new Allied bridgehead was established opposite SPEYER against negligible opposition and rapid advances followed.

In the Rhine Valley, advances south and east were being made against light resistance. East of the ODENWALD, the enemy undertook an effective delaying action as battered divisions were being hurried into line. These units were augmented by replacement units and miscellaneous battle group formations moved west from Wehrkreise XIII and IX. The bulk of these units took up positions and established a line along the Neckar to its junction with the Jagst River (S 0571) - east along Jagst to BAD MERGENTHEIM (N 4701) - north to KOENIGSHOFEN (N 4407) area - east to railroad (N 7813) - north along railroad to MARKTBRIET (N 7421). By 3 April, Allied forces encountered stubborn resistance along the line's entire length. The determined defenders of ASCHAFFENBURG were outflanked by rapid friendly advances in the SPESSART. Completely surrounded, the city was mopped up by 3 April; the enemy having suffered an estimated 4,600 casualties, KARLSRUHE and KLINGENBERG (S 0359) were cleared on 4 April.

By 5 April, increased resistance from SIEGFRIED Line positions developed as French forces pushed toward RASTATT and PFORZHEIM. Stubborn opposition continued to be offered in the area from HEILBRONN to WURZBURG. Breaches of the Neckar - Jagst line at NECKARGARTACH (S 0764) and vicinity S 0974 met sharp enemy reactions, clearly evidencing the enemy's concern over any southward expansion. The bridgehead across the Main at OCHSENFURT (S 6720) was strongly opposed. Heavy fighting witnessed the US troops progress in WURZBURG. On 5 April, the town was bypassed and ROTTENDORF (N 6535) was reached without opposition. The Main River was crossed from west to east, on a damaged bridge at KITZINGEN (N 7429) against light resistance. To the north, the advances through the SPESSART continued against scattered delaying actions and armored spearheads had driven east to SUHL (J 0927) and GOTHA (J 0864).

On 7 April, the advance of friendly troops was slowed as strong resistance was encountered south of MORSCH (R 4040) and ETTLINGEN (R 4938). The enemy still offered determined resistance on the east and south side of the Neckar-Jagst River lines respectively. However, the enemy in the vicinity of DORZBACH (S 4389) was apparently thin as Allied armor on 6 April broke through for a 25 mile run to the important communications center of CRAILSHEIM (S 7062). At the end of the period, there were indications of an enemy build-up in rear of the CRAILSHEIM breakthrough and resistance was stiffening in the southwest approaches to SCHWEINFURT (N 7762), and OSTHEIM (H 7709) were reached.

c. ALPINE FRONT

Enemy forces stubbornly opposed Allied attempts to capture a bunker two kilometers from HOSPICE of PETIT ST BERNARD on 31 March. Superior forces, however reduced the bunker, taking 32 German and 4 Italian prisoners. Attacking again on 5 April, the enemy was forced to relinquish the Fort of MT FROID. Prisoners taken in this action were 21 German and 1 Italian. A snow storm caused considerable difficulties during attacks on enemy positions, on 6 April, in the vicinity of MT CENIS. A friendly cruiser off CAP MARTIN (S 7584) was bombed on 1 April by a jet propelled plane. Mortar and artillery fire was generally light and scattered, the central and southern zones receiving the major portion. Enemy patrols were reported north of SOSPEL (S 7498), at POINTIN (N 4635), and east of NEVACHE (K 3711) during period.

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d. ATLANTIC FRONT

In the LA ROCHELLE Pocket, an enemy reconnaissance party of company strength was active on 3 April near FERRIERS (T 5342) and NUALLE (T 4841). Enemy concentrations were reported at VERINES (T 4538) and SERIGNY (T 4346). The following day, enemy reconnaissance in force caused friendly outposts between ST JEAN (T 5346) and FERRIERS to withdraw. After an artillery duel, these same positions were regained. A good source reports the arrival at LA ROCHELLE of small groups of enemy troops and equipment from LORIENT and ST NAZAIRE. The enemy in the ROYAN and GRAVE pockets was generally quiet. However, artillery was unusually active from the ROYAN pocket on 3 April when 100 rounds were fired.

5. COMMUNICATION

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Coverage of enemy movements was limited throughout the current period by operational difficulties and weather conditions. Observations of rail traffic were the most significant, revealing traffic headed for the front from STUTTGART early in the week and the locus of activity shifting subsequently to the NURNBERG area.

On 31 March, 10-12 trains were seen moving north and west from STUTTGART and traffic was also seen throughout the SINSHEIM-BRUCHSAL-BIETIGHEIM area. Similar trends were reported on 1 April with moderately heavy traffic again seen in the vicinity of STUTTGART. The indications were that the Germans were attempting to bring up small replacements of troops and supplies to check Allied advances in the KARLSRUHE - HEIDELBERG area. This appears logical in view of the large number of military areas and supply installations in and around STUTTGART. Scattered road movement in this period was largely eastbound out of HEILBRONN and WURZBURG.

In the latter half of the week, NURNBERG seemed to replace STUTTGART as the center of activity as Allied forces approached the former city. On 5 April, a total of 13 trains were seen between NURNBERG (O 4200 and AUGSBURG (Y 3380) and 3 military trains loaded with motor transport were sighted on the north-south line through DONAUWORTH (T 2318). Intense rail activity was also sighted on lines leading west from NURNBERG, particularly on the NURNBERG - HALL axis. Some of this traffic, particularly on the north-south lines, appeared to be normal, since these are the only main lines far enough removed from the expanding battle area to permit routine supply and troop movements and what little economic traffic is carried. It is likely, however, that the heavy movement on the lines leading to the west was direct supply to the front from the NURNBERG area.

B. Effects of Allied Air Attacks

In the past week, Allied air attacks shifted from enemy transportation to supplies. With the rapid forward movement of Allied ground forces, the enemy must rely on his supply installations close to the front lines rather than on long haul transport to maintain his troops. Even small losses of material at these forward points could result in serious tactical difficulties. These attacks by Allied air forces not only included depots and dumps, but also attacks on rail centers which have been operating as enemy railheads.

Fighter bomber attacks at the beginning of the week covered a large number of small marshalling yards on the fringe of the battle area. These operations were paralleled by medium bomber attacks on HEILBRONN marshalling yard, quay, and sidings and on the rail centers at CRAILSHEIM and WURZBURG. In the past the enemy has established his railheads as near the front line as possible in order to save on motor transport or horse-drawn hauls to the front lines, and it is likely that these attacks deprived front line troops of weapons, ammunition and vehicle replacements.

Several important supply depots within fifty miles of the battle area were also hit. A number of installations for motor transport repair and storage in the STUTTGART area were included in this operation, as well as the large ordnance depot at TUBINGEN (W 9793). Although further from the battle area, the Eighth Air Force bombardment of 5 April of the extensive ordnance depot at INGOLSTADT, in the MUNICH-AUGSBURG area, was significant. This TUBINGEN depot is probably a collecting and

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distributing point for ordnance armored force vehicles manufactured in the industrial area to the south and is thus an important source of supplies for both the Eastern and Western Front.

Enemy oil and ammunition depots also suffered attacks. The most important of these was the elaborate KLEIN - ENGSTINGEN ammunition depot south of REUTLINGEN (X 1085) and probable filling plant. It was used to supply enemy troops on the First French Army front.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

#1 Inc - Enemy Disposition

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Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

:By Authority of :
:CG, 6th Army Group :
:Initials: *S. J. L.* :
:Date: 24 March 1945: :
:.....:

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 27

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 24 MARCH 1945



1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Army Group G has been reduced to merely an expression as a result of its complete and overwhelming defeat in the SAAR-PALATINATE. The process of destruction of Army Group G started with the annihilation of Nineteenth Army in the VOSGES Pocket. The forced assumption of supervision of Seventh Army early in March failed to infuse the Army Group with sufficient revitalizing strength to avoid its present fate. The beaten enemy has been almost completely evicted from west of the Rhine with losses estimated to have exceeded 75% of the combat effectives and approximately 50% of the total military personnel initially located in the area prior to the attack. His losses in tanks, guns, equipment and supplies were at a proportionate level. In addition, strategic territory has been yielded by the enemy.

Army Group G under SS General HAUSSER can hardly hope to gain new recuperative powers or changes in obvious missions. The right flank of the Army Group borders Fifteenth Army's flank on the Lahn River, with its left flank extending to the vicinity of KARLSRUHE. Its primary mission of defending this long stretch of the Rhine River was already made dubious of accomplishment as a result of a successful Allied crossing north of GERNESHEIM (M 5430). Its main efforts will now be to contain this new breach. Enemy forces available for this task are insufficient in numbers and are presently in a greatly disorganized state. The arrival of divisional units will not be numerous or immediate as a strategic threat of large proportions exist in the REMAGEN bridgehead area and the crossings of the Lower Rhine in vicinity of WESEL will of necessity have priorities exceeding those in our area. Unit reinforcements will continue to be piecemeal and will be ineffectual.

Seventh German Army during the previous period had its right flank pierced by a rapid US armoured thrust. During the present period a swift exploitation of the above success, plus the collapse of First Army's flank, resulted in the reduction of the army to a few remnants retreating over the Rhine into the area of WIESBADEN. The army will be hard pressed to maintain the right flank of the Army Group even on the River line for only remnants of 6 SS Mountain and 198 Infantry Divisions known to have crossed the river between BINGEN and MAINZ. Additional bits and pieces no doubt escaped, but they are not large and cannot hope to be a coordinated force for some days. To say that the army has a mission would only serve to color its title. Its capabilities are restricted to either total destruction or further withdrawal into the province of HESSE.

The First German Army has a new commander, Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH. He was formerly Chief of Staff of Army Group F in the BALKANS. The army successfully withdrew into the SIEGFRIED Line and maintained a firm left flank hinged on the Rhine River until the very end. However, the failure of its right flank to hold out sealed not only the doom of Seventh Army but also allowed the SIEGFRIED Line to be rolled up from the rear. What remains of the army is merely a shell. The army cannot hope to be revived by replacements from the interior of Germany. Its resuscitation can be only at the expense of divisions from other fronts.

The Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth German Armies continue their defensive roles in BADEN and along the Swiss border respectively.

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b. Capabilities

The enemy is completely restricted to a single capability: to withdraw into the interior of Germany before our advancing forces.

He is faced with the task of containing simultaneously several bridgeheads. In our area, he must specifically prevent the Allies from outflanking the ODENWALD and seizing the FRANKFURT area in order to block the southern approaches to KASSEL. The disorganized state of his troops and the insufficiency of presently available reinforcements do not permit listing this as an enemy capability. Reinforcements of sufficient strength and quality for such a possibility could be drawn only from another front or from NORWAY. In neither case could they arrive in time.

The bulk of the defeated remnants evacuated from the SAAR-PALATINATE may most probably be deployed between MAINZ and MANNHEIM in the hope of delaying the fall of DARMSTADT and protecting the road to KASSEL. Since the SIEGFRIED Line extends to the vicinity of GERMERSHEIM and there is not so imminent a threat to the KARLSRUHE area, it would be logical to extend the responsibility of Nineteenth Army as far north as MANNHEIM. In such case, Nineteenth Army could use its partially prepared static forces to receive the remnants of First Army and join in the defense of the river lines to the east in the direction of the Allied advance.

In any case, the initiative is entirely in the hands of the Allies. The enemy can only try, and without hope of eventual success, to delay the final surrender.

2. 6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (Rhine Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposite 6th Army Group were as follows: along the Rhine River from KOBLENZ (L 8895) to LUDWIGSHAVEN (R 5296) thence to SPEYER (R 5180), IGGELHEIM (R 4385), FRIESBACH (R 3976), LINGENFELD (R 4572), KUhardt (R 4360), LEIMERSHEIM (R 4458), SCHAIDT (R 2551), NEUBURG (R 3743), thence elsewhere along the Rhine River to the Swiss Border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: SS Gen. HAUSSEr)

(Since the correct alignment of Corps and Divisions are unknown at the present time, for the sake of convenience these units are listed according to their last known subordination.)

Seventh and First German Armies have very likely taken over jurisdiction of areas east of the Rhine opposite their former sectors. Of the Corps, LXXXIX Corps is reported as north of MAINZ, while XC Corps still controls 905 Volksgrenadier, 257 Volksgrenadier and the RAESSLER Divisions in the area GERMERSHEIM-KARLSRUHE. Unlocated Corps include: XIII, XIII SS, LXXX, LXXXII, and LXXXV. The divisions listed below have suffered extremely heavy casualties and for all practical purposes must be considered destroyed.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. UTZ) was destroyed during the period in the SAAR-PALATINATE, seven weeks after having suffered a similar fate in the VOSGES Pocket. Over 1,000 prisoners had been taken by 17 March. When the division was last contacted at KASTEL (L 4407), its disorganized remnants were fighting in alarm companies that did not total more than 300 combat infantry effectives.

9 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: KOLB) was used to cover withdrawals over the Moselle at the beginning of the period at ZELL (L 6158). Remnants were last contacted at L 8725 and L 7731 on 20 March. During the last days, the end came to the division. However, a new 36 Volksgrenadier Regiment is known to be reforming at WILDFLECKEN and may soon reappear east of the Rhine.

79 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Lt. Col. HOBE) was last contacted attempting to salvage at least 1,000 men by permitting small groups to infiltrate toward the Rhine from the area of KRIEBSFELD (M 1323). Much of 212 Grenadier Regiment had been caught on the run from L 7113 to L 7621 on 19 March, while 226 Grenadier Regiment may have gotten remnants across in the vicinity of SPEYER. Of its total of 2,000 on 15 March, not more than 300 combat infantry effectives remain.

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155 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BUERCKY) was swept to the southwest by our armored drive. Elements were scattered between BAD KREUZNACH and WORMS on 20 March. Few remnants of its 1,500 (16 March) men could have escaped over the Rhine. Combat infantry effectives number approximately 300.

212 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) was thoroughly destroyed when fallen upon by Allied troops near SLEINACHENBACH (L 8122). Upon learning that escape routes to the Rhine could not be found, commanding General (Gen. SENSFUSS) shot himself. Remnants of the division amount to 200 combat infantry effectives.

246 Infantry Division (CG: KUEHNE) elements of this division were last identified in the vicinity of L 7731 near KIRNON 20 March. Not more than scattered remnants are believed to have survived.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) tried to forestall the inevitable by staging a counterattack in its sector east of TRIER at the beginning of the period. Results of the attack were disastrous as artillery preparation and heavy weapons support were totally inadequate. The division resorted to the drafting of Volkssturm to fill in gaps, but these too, were insufficient. Last contact with all major units was on 20 March in area L 7626 - L 8516. Not more than 300 combat infantry effectives are believed to have escaped across the Rhine.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFIEGER) drafted Volkssturm men to fill some of the ranks in its sadly depleted units. Ultimately this expedient proved to be of no avail. What remained of the division was badly mauled in the Allied breakthrough to ST WENDEL. Stragglers were picked up in the NEUSTADT area on 22 March. No effective combat infantry strength is believed left among remnants which escaped across the Rhine.

560 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) the division headquarters was overrun on 17 March. PW's state that the unit yielded its last 150 men to 352 Infantry Division on 8 March. However, the last remnants were destroyed in a pocket west of WORMS on 21 March.

(1) Seventh German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FELBER)

The subsequent exploitation of the US breakthrough to BAD KREUZNACH during the previous period and the collapse of LXXXII Corps early in the week created a void on the left flank of First German Army whereby the annihilation of this army was made certain. LXXXIX Corps had transferred to Seventh Army about 13/14 March but it was eventually withdrawn to the east bank of the Rhine between KOBLENZ and MAINZ where it is presently located. XIII and LXXX Corps were located along the Moselle River prior to their forced withdrawal. Reinforcements plus cadres from the remnants of escaped divisions can contribute little to Seventh Army's strength.

2 Panzer Division (CG: LAUCHERT) began its attempt to stem the flood of Allied armor with a four hour fight at BAD KREUZNACH (M 0938) on 18 March, where elements of 3 Panzer Regiment and both Panzer Grenadier Regiments were identified. Remnants were at M 1636 and between M 3727 - M 4330 on 20 March. Divisional remnants crossed the Rhine between WORMS and MANNHEIM. Its combat infantry effectives may number 400, while guns and tanks are believed destroyed and/or abandoned.

6 SS Mountain Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BRENNER). Our simultaneous drives caught both pieces of this divided division off guard. Along the northern MOSELLE, 11 SS Mountain Regiment was pressed against the Rhine. However, it was able to cross and later play a small part in the defense of MAINZ. 12 SS Mountain Regiment and other elements moved in the SCHLEIDEN (L 2706) area were well-nigh destroyed in the rout. Total combat infantry effectives are approximated at 400.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH)

On 6 March Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER was replaced as Commanding General of First German Army by Lt. Gen. FOERTSCH, formerly Chief of Staff of Army Group F. The army under its new commander fared little better than Seventh German during the period and for all practical purposes can be considered destroyed. The maintaining of a firm left flank in the SIEGFRIED Line, aided immeasurably those enemy forces escaping from the SAAR-PALATINATE.

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Of the thirteen divisions in First Army at the beginning of the period three divisions (256 VG, 416 Inf, and 2 Mtn Divs) are considered destroyed. The remaining ten divisions (719 Inf, 347 Inf, 19 Inf, 17 SS PG, 16 VG, 36 VG, 257 VG, 905 VG, 47 VG, and RAESSLER Divs) all suffered extremely heavy casualties in men and equipment.

(a) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

Upon the departure of LXXXIX Corps, XC Corps assumed control of 36 Volksgrenadier, 257 Volksgrenadier, 905 Volksgrenadier, and RAESSLER Divisions with the task of holding the SIEGFRIED Line and denying us the approaches down the Rhine Valley. It was successfully performing its mission up to the time its rear became threatened. Whereupon, it was forced to withdraw over the Rhine River in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE at the close of the period.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELIM) withdrew the bulk of its units into the defenses of SIEGFRIED Line northwest of WISSENBURG, by 22 March under the covering actions of 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment supported by some Volkssturm troops. From these positions, the division fought with much determination. Orders were subsequently issued to the troops to make their way over the Rhine individually and by any available means. Combat infantry effectives of organic units is 800.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SEIDEL) is one of the stronger units left to the enemy. It exchanged sectors with 905 Division, and assumed responsibility for the vital left flank of the First Army, anchored on the Rhine. This flank had to be held at all costs to keep open an escape gap for what remained of Army Group G. This mission was accomplished as the division managed to hold its SIEGFRIED Line positions, until the end. The losses in manpower, however, were considerable as close contact was maintained throughout the period. Present combat infantry strength is estimated at not more than 1,000.

Division RAESSLER (CG: Brig. Gen. RAESSLER) was discovered to have been lurking behind our front for some time and to have been responsible for the manning of SIEGFRIED defenses in the Rhine Valley, north and north-east of WISSENBURG. As our attacks forced the withdrawal of 905 and 257 Division to the SIEGFRIED Line, elements of Division RAESSLER became interpressed among the two. The following divisional organization is given in a captured document dated 2 March: BG WIENWALD controlling: Fortress AT Bn 502, Fortress AA Bn 802, Volkssturm Bns 40/1 and 40/3, 5 and 6 Cos Fortress AT Regt XVIII, 3 Co Fortress Cadre Bn 112. BG OTTERBACH controlling: 52 GAF Bn, Volkssturm Bn 40/47, 4 Co Fortress Cadre Bn 112. BG LESBERG controlling Landeschützen Bn 1015, Volkssturm Bn 40/7, Fortress MG Bn 58, 2 and 3 Cos Fortress AT Regt XVIII, 2 Co Fortress Cadre Bn 112. Staff Fortress Arty Regt 1245 controlling: 1304, 1503, 1507 Fortress Arty Bns. Of these the following were identified during the week: 112 Fortress Cadre Battalion, elements XVIII Anti-Tank Regiment, 52 German Air Force Battalion, 58 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion, 40/3, 40/7, 40/47 Volkssturm Battalions. Present combat infantry effectives among these units total approximately 1,000.

905 Volksgrenadier Division (CG:) switched positions with 257 Volksgrenadier Division to take over a sector north-east of WISSENBURG. Several prisoners claimed that the division has been upgraded to Volksgrenadier status. This is supported by the identification of a 905 Fusilier Company. The composition of the division is as follows: Regiment MARBACH (Bns SCHMIDT and TREUTLER), Regiment GIESECKE (Bns SARNOW and WEYGAND), Artillery Unit SCHILLER, 905 Fusilier Company, and an Engineer Battalion. Regiment MARBACH was last identified at R 1652 on 21 March, Regiment GIESECKE on 20 March, 905 Fusilier Company at R 1553 on 22 March. Deducting losses sustained during a week of costly fighting, the division is now estimated at 600 combat infantry effectives.

(b) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HAHN)

(c) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNISS)

(d) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Major Gen. MAX SIMON)

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GAEDE) pulled out of its SIEGFRIED positions after the deep Allied penetrations north and south of its sector (SAARLAUTERN-MERZIG) had made them untenable. Some elements were trapped by the Allied junction in the HOMBURG area, but straggler indications were had in the

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KAISERSLAUTERN area on 22 March. Combat infantry strength of divisional units that crossed the Rhine is about 800.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) lost heavily in our initial assaults. When the precariousness of the situation became apparent, the division withdrew by echelons. By 19 March all regiments had been pulled out of line, leaving only miscellaneous fortress units to delay the friendly advance. Nevertheless, elements of the division were caught in the pocket north of SAARBRUCKEN and not more than 500 combat infantry effectives escaped capture or destruction.

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) resisted strongly during the early days of the offensive. It was ably assisted by numerous miscellaneous units including local Volkssturm Battalions. 59 Volksgrenadier Regiment is now known to have been dissolved, and the remainder of the division suffered heavily in men and material during its withdrawal. GHQ units were sacrificed in order to aid in the departure of the divisional remains over the Rhine. However, elements were pocketed in the area of ST INGBERT (Q 5476) and gathered up. Escaped combat infantry effectives total 500.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: SS. Col. KLINGENBERG) was still in contact on 20 March but had incurred heavy casualties up to that date. Its route of withdrawal was from a position northwest of BITCHE to north of PIRMASENS. After having lost 1,300 prisoners on 20 March, the SS officers appropriated units in the vicinity in order to bolster the ranks. For example 6 SS Mountain Replacement Battalion from 6 SS Mountain Division was forced into service on the line after it had been en route to its parent unit and the remnants of I/935 VGR and I/937 VGR of 16 Volksgrenadier Division were formed into Battle Group GUGERBERGER. This novel exhibition of initiative was very temporary in its effect. At present, only remnants of 37 and 38 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiments exist. Divisional combat infantry effectives are estimated at 600.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MOECKEL) fought with determination from SIEGFRIED positions south of PIRMASENS. Heavy casualties were sustained during a week of costly fighting. The division started its withdrawal to the Rhine on or about 20 March, when Allied advances south of KAISERSLAUTERN threatened its axis of retreat. Present combat infantry strength is judged at 700.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was split up at the beginning of the period and was employed in the familiar stop-gap fashion. 104 Regimental Staff, controlling I Battalion 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment and II Battalion 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment, shifted westward. The former was committed at SAARBRUCKEN and the latter north of ST WENDEL. 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment moved north toward the BAD KREUZNACH salient, where it was identified at M 2830 on 20 March. It probably crossed the Rhine between MAINZ and WORMS. II Battalion 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment was last contacted in its old area at Q 9527 on 15 March, I Battalion 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment at Q 9532 on 18 March. If the divisional staff ever manages to reassemble these far-flung elements, they will not total more than 800 combat infantry effectives.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen von der MUEHLEN) suffered disastrously after having been caught in the pincers of our armored drive. Complete chaos resulted when contact was lost between the troops and their commanders. On 18 March, 1126 Grenadier Regiment had elements at L 8346 and also Q 3890 which illustrates the manner in which its forces had become separated. On the same day, 1127 Grenadier Regiment had troops at M 0734 and the next day at L 6406. While both regiments were identified in the M 3021 area on 21 March, the division's final mauling in the area west of the Rhine occurred later in the period in the vicinity of WORMS. It is estimated that some 400 combat infantry effectives reached the east bank of the Rhine.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) had been reformed from elements of 716 Infantry Division, at KARLSRUHE from where two of its regiments were sent on 16 March to stem our armored drive. One regiment (326 GR) was committed in the area south-east of SIMMERN (L 8556) on 16 March and its subsequent withdrawal route took it southeast across the Nahe River and then north to BINGEN, where it crossed the Rhine. 300 Grenadier Regiment was first contacted east of BAD KREUZNACH (M 0938) and withdrew toward MAINZ, as did 305 Grenadier Regiment. After having lost 600 men in two days prior to 18 March, the division is estimated to have only 600 combat infantry effectives left east of the Rhine.

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(e) Volkssturm. Ten Volkssturm battalions were contacted during this period which had been recruited from GAU WESTMARK. In addition, documentary evidence showed that a policy had been adopted to utilize 25% of the younger men as reinforcements for divisional units. The average strength of these battalions is 400.

c. Nineteenth German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

Lt. Gen. RASP was taken ill early in March and was replaced by Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER, the former commander of First German Army. It is very likely that Nineteenth Army has extended its sphere of responsibility as far north as MANNHEIM. Inasmuch as the SIEGFRIED Line defenses extend to the area of GERMERSHEIM and the areas around the cities of SPEYER and MANNHEIM are known to be fortress areas, such an extension would create no change in the purely static defensive mission of Nineteenth Army.

(a) IXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. THUMM). Mission and location unchanged.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER). It has been discovered by a captured document that SS Lt. Gen. KEPPLER former commander of XIII SS Corps replaced SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH as Commanding General of XVIII SS Corps during February. The former commander of the corps is believed to have gone to the Eastern Front with HIMMLER.

Mission and location unchanged.

(d) DEFENSE COMMAND OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt. Gen. MAUR)

No Change Reported.

405 Reserve Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SEEGER) remains in positions along the Rhine, north and south of KEHL (W 0596).

805 Mobilization Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von OPPEN)

No Change.

1005 Brigade Staff (CO: .)

No Change.

(e) Twenty-Fourth (CG: SS Lt. Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

No Change reported.

(f) 600 Infantry Division (Russian) Failure to receive any additional information concerning the existence of this division, beyond the single documentary report received early in February, is sufficient grounds for dropping the unit.

(g) ENEMY STRENGTH OPPOSITE 6th ARMY GROUP
(Army Group G and Nineteenth Army Fronts)

Divisional Units on Army Group G Front:

Combat Infantry Effectives:

Army Group "G" Front	10,000
Nineteenth Army Front	<u>4,000</u>

T O T A L	14,000
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Reserves: (Estimated)

Army Group "G" Front	-----
Nineteenth Army Front	<u>1,000</u>

T O T A L	15,000
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Tanks and SP Guns:

Army Group "G" Front	80-100
Nineteenth Army Front	<u>10- 10</u>

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3. 6th ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the 6th Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: CHAMONIX (C 4728), MT ROSELETTE (Z 4091), BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080), VILLAROCER (H 4692), BESSANS (H 5260), MT TABOR (K 3522), BRIANCON (P 3898), CHATEAU QUEYRAS (P 5382), GUILLESTRE (P 4170), BARCELONETTE (P 4341), ISOLA (N 4635), ST MARTIN (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088).

a. Enemy Dispositions

There has been no perceptible change in enemy dispositions on this front. Twenty-five prisoners were captured north-east of BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 5080) on 23 March, of this number half proved to be Germans, the remainder were Italians. Such an even distribution among combat troops indicated more widespread use of German nationals in the northern sector than had been supposed. Confirmation of the location of the MONTE ROSA Division's MORBEGNO Battalion, north-west of MONT CENIS was made by PW interrogation.

b. General

The advent of more favorable weather conditions has permitted the enemy to carry out extensive forays on our outpost line. Despite the persistence of rumors concerning imminent withdrawals from the front, the enemy's status quo continues to be upheld.

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4. OPERATIONS

RHINE FRONT

The sector along the Rhine River as far north as DRUSENHEIM (R 1517) continued to be quiet. Enemy nuisance raids which averaged one per day were confined to the STRASBOURG area. On 18 March, a friendly patrol to the east bank of the river south of MARKT DAM (A 8890) had a very weak enemy reaction. Other than the 18 rounds of railway artillery which fell on COLMAR on 17 March, artillery and mortar fire was extremely light.

SAAR-PALATINATE FRONT

At the beginning of the period, the German First Army was being forced by our attack to conduct a general withdrawal to the SIEGFRIED Line, in the Rhine Valley and the HARDT Mountains areas. The enemy executed this move so rapidly that contact was lost for a time before being regained on 18 March at LAUTERBOURG (R 3241). West of the HARDT, the enemy was stubbornly resisting from prepared positions which he had earlier occupied. The Allied thrusts toward ST VENDEL (Q 5997) from the east and BAD KREUZNACH (M 1038) from the north forced the transfer northwards of 47 Volksgrenadier Division from the eastern HARDT area.

By 19 March it became obvious that the SIEGFRIED Line positions in the SAAR Valley were being hopelessly outflanked. Then began the withdrawal of 719 and 347 Infantry Divisions which accounted for the lack of opposition to our crossing of the Saar River, west of SAARBRUCKEN. Meanwhile, elements of 17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division were shifted to the NEUNKIRCHEN (Q 6083) area where a counterattack was staged in order to temporarily maintain a route of escape. SAARBRUCKEN (Q 4671) and HOMBURG (Q 7181) were cleared against negligible opposition and ST INGBERT (Q 5576) was found unoccupied on 20 March. The momentum of the coordinated offensive in the SAAR-PALATINATE had, by this time, reached its full swing. Allied Forces from the north took LANDSTUHL (Q 8890) and KAISERSLAUTERN (Q 0394) and the German First and Seventh Armies were in full and definite retreat. Extrication of the remaining enemy forces was attempted by a turning movement hinged on FIRMASENS (Q 9167) and a withdrawal to a line along the western HARDT. In the Rhine Valley, 257 and 905 Volksgrenadier Divisions exchanged sectors but continued to offer stubborn opposition. Artillery fire also increased in this area in a determined effort to hold SIEGFRIED positions in the Rhine Valley. Although 161 Volksgrenadier Division fell back in the face of overpowering opposition, 36 Volksgrenadier and RAESSLER Divisions held strongly and succeeded in regaining some lost ground in the vicinity of LUDWIGSWINKEL (Q 9553).

Aided by the SIEGFRIED Line, the defenders of the BIENWALD held firm on 21 March, launching unsuccessful counterattacks in the STEINFELD (R 2250) area. In the north, however, the advancing Allied Forces had cleared the Rhine as far south as LUDWIGSHAFEN, had taken the vital communications center of NEUSTADT, and had cut off remaining units in the HARDT by severing the main line of retreat at ANNUEILER (R 1667). On 22 March 36 Volksgrenadier Division began a withdrawal and the forces remaining could not prevent our breaching the line in the region of DORRENBACH (R 1654). The breakthrough that followed removed all doubt as to the fate of the remnants still left in the HARDT. On 22 March, LANDAU was taken and the MAXIMILIANSAU Bridge (R 4148) was reported unserviceable. Friendly troops found the SPEYER Bridge (R 5280) destroyed on 23 March which canalized all the retreating traffic toward the GERMERSHEIM Bridge (R 4769) which was found destroyed the next day. The pivot in the BIENWALD Forest was held by 257, 905 and RAESSLER Divisions until the very end of the period when resistance west of the Rhine had practically collapsed. The front line now runs along the Rhine River except for scattered groups in the GERMERSHEIM area.

ATLANTIC FRONT

Activity in the Atlantic pockets was confined to the usual exchange of artillery fire and normal patrolling. Some truck movement was reported in the northern portion of the LA ROCHELLE pocket on 20 March and in the AIGREFEVILLE (T 4729) region on 22 March. ST VIVIEN (Y 3653) was the center of interest in the GRAVE pocket where enemy working parties were observed throughout the period.

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Enemy patrols and raiding parties were particularly active during the period in the central sector. On successive days CHALET DE L'HORTIERE (K 4630), BRIANCON (P 3898) and the passes at PETIT ST BERNARD (Z 87) and PETIT MOUNTCENIS were the scenes of patrol activity. The enemy attacked friendly outposts in the MONTGENEVRE (K 4502) sector on 21 March but was forced to withdraw after a lively skirmish. Two enemy positions in the region of BOURG ST MAURICE (Z 87) were occupied on 23 March and twenty five German and Italian prisoners taken. Artillery and mortar fire was generally light along the entire front.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

Clear weather prevailed throughout the period on all days except 21 March, thus making possible excellent coverage of enemy movements throughout the 6th Army Group area. All out withdrawals along the roads within the SAAR-PALATINATE marked the extremely heavy activity seen in this area throughout the week. The little rail movement that was seen west of the Rhine likewise showed an easterly trend. Coverage revealed heavy barge and pontoon activity along the Rhine and showed heavy rail traffic on lines radiating from KARLSRUHE on 18 and 19 March. Later in the week, very little rail movement was seen in the eastern Rhine Valley. However, traffic continued on the north-south rail lines in the HEILBRONN area throughout the period. Extensive rail activity was also noted in the Black Forest region during the week with two-way traffic being especially noticeable on the ROTTWEIL-STUTTGART and OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN lines.

Hundreds of motor transports, horse drawn wagons, motorcycles and vehicles of all types clogged main and secondary roads in the SAAR-PALATINATE as the enemy frantically tried to salvage troops and equipment from the rapidly disintegrating pocket formed by Third and Seventh Army troops. With only one or two rail lines open, very limited rail activity was possible and most of the traffic was, of necessity, forced onto the roads. In the KAISERSLAUTERN-BAD DURKHEIM-NEUSTADT area approximately 1500 vehicles of all kinds were seen on 20 March and 500-800 others were sighted on 21 March throughout the PIRMASENS-BERGZABERN-LANDAU region. Large concentrations of demolished vehicles littered east-west roads from FRANKENSTEIN to BAD DURKHEIM and from ANNWEILER to LANDAU on both of these days as Allied aircraft continued to pound fleeing convoys on their way toward the Rhine. Permanent rail and road bridges, pontoon bridges, ferries and barges, all were in readiness to insure the passage of withdrawing troops over the Rhine. As Allied troops kept advancing, however, one by one the large permanent type bridges were blown until at the close of the period none were left standing.

Main lines of retreat for enemy forces trapped within the pocket west of the Rhine followed roads running east from KAISERSLAUTERN to NEUSTADT over the bridge at SPEYER and roads from PIRMASENS to LANDAU and across the river at GERMERSHEIM. However, temporary crossings all along the river from WORMS to KARLSRUHE were active in transporting troops.

Good coverage of 18/19 March revealed extensive rail and road traffic throughout the KARLSRUHE-STUTTGART-EBERBACH-DARMSTADT area with indications that some scratch formations were being gathered to hold the eastern banks of the Rhine from MANNHEIM to KARLSRUHE against U. S. crossings. At the close of the current period, however, movement along lines running from KARLSRUHE to the north appeared to have diminished greatly, and it became evident that the Germans were relying upon alternate lines further east to move their troops and supplies. The EBERBACH-STUTTGART line was very active with 2-way traffic on 19 and 23 March and heavy barge activity was seen on the Neckar River from HEILBRONN to HEIDELBERG on all days except 19 and 20 March.

Indications are that lines throughout the Black Forest were also used for re-routing traffic to and from the Rhine Valley. The ROTTWEIL-STUTTGART line showed marked activity on every day of the period and although 2-way traffic was sighted, it seems logical to conclude that this line together with the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN route, which was also consistently active throughout the week, is being used to service enemy forces in the threatened Rhine Valley area particularly in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE.

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B. Effect of Allied Air Attacks

The enemy's losses in men, materiel, and territory in the past week were accentuated by the activities of Allied aircraft in and behind the battle area. These operations cut the enemy's path of withdrawal and then decimated him as he tried to clear a way out. At the same time, the routes and supplies of reinforcements on the east bank of the Rhine were subject to effective attacks.

(1) Communications. While Allied advances on the ground were continually cutting the main arteries of rail and road transportation within the battle area, leaving many isolated groups of enemy troops in a state of hopeless bewilderment, the enemy's communications lines on both banks of the Rhine were sliced by medium and fighter bombers. After a few days, virtually all rail traffic within the battle area disappeared, and Allied planes were greeted by the unusual sight of large numbers of enemy M/T on the roads during daylight hours. On the east bank, rail cuts were applied on all lines leading into MANNHEIM, and particular attention was paid to the north-south line feeding into the area from KARLSRUHE to MANNHEIM and HEIDELBERG. In the latter part of the week, the mediums participated in a series of attacks on rail crossings over the Neckar River, leaving the enemy two, perhaps three tenuous north-south lines leading into Third US Army's bridgehead from supply centers at ULM, STUTTGART, HEILBRONN, and PFORZHEIM. The attack of 23 March on HEIDELBERG marshalling yard, when it was three fourths full, not only halted all rail traffic in the yard by probably cost the enemy needed supplies being unloaded for the defense of the east bank of the Rhine.

(2) Motorized Equipment. The combined effect of ground and air attacks, in addition to the blowing of the Rhine bridges north of SPEYER, forced the enemy to funnel his movements through the KAISERSLAUTERN-NEUSTADT line before fanning out toward SPEYER, GERMERSHEIM, and MAXAU. The resulting crowding of M/T gave the fighter bombers a field day, and claims of XIX and XII TAC in the past week surpassed 4000 M/T destroyed and over 3000 damaged. Even making allowance for the normal inflation of such claims - and this inflation is likely to be especially large here due to the considerable number of M/T carcasses which accumulated along the roads after repeated attacks, it is nevertheless evident that a serious toll was taken of a critical item in the enemy's larder of equipment. It is likely that prior to the Allied offensive, the enemy units in the SAAR-PALATINATE were limping along on considerably less than the 400 odd trucks allotted in the divisional T/E, and these heavy losses on the west bank of the Rhine will mean curtailed mobility on the east bank.

(3) Defenses. On 16 March, the medium bombers poured 450 tons of bombs onto a large defensive installation in the SIEGFRIED Line at ZWEIBRUECKEN. PW reports of this attack indicate that great success was achieved, not only in the destruction of pill boxes and other fortifications, but also in the severe demoralization of the personnel manning them.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON

Brigadier General, G. S.C.

A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

- #1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
- #2 Inc - Enemy Disposition


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


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